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LABOR LAW-THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD'S JURIS
DICTIONAL POWER OVER HANDICAPPED EMPLOYEES IN SHEL
TERED WORKSHOPS

INTRODUCTION

The National Labor Relations Act l (NLRA) facilitates the free
flow of interstate commerce by regulating employer-employee rela
tionships.2 Although the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations
Board (Board) must be broad in order to carry out the purpose of the
NLRA, 3 the Board's jurisdiction is limited to "employers"4 and "em
ployees."5 Because the NLRA defines these terms very broadly,6 the
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982) (original version at ch. 372,49 Stat. 449 (1935».
2. Congress found that employers who denied their employees the right to organize
and to bargain collectively forced employees to strike, which led to industrial strife and
burdened and obstructed commerce. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). Congress determined that
protecting employees' rights to organize and bargain collectively safeguarded the consis
tency and flow of commerce. [d. Congress set out to eliminate and mitigate obstructions
and causes of obstructions of commerce. [d.
3. Congress specifically decided to allow the Board to have broad jurisdiction in or
der to effectuate the policies of the Act. The House of Representatives stated that
the power of the Board under the ... act in the matter of unfair labor practices is
exclusive. . . . The rule of exclusive jurisdiction was developed many years ago
. . . to provide for uniformity in matters of national policy under the commerce
clause.
H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 40, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947 at 292, 331 (1974). Furthermore, the Sen
ate indicated that "[the NLRA] has demonstrated that ... [due to] lengthy hearings and
litigation enforcing its orders, the Board has not been able . . . to correct unfair labor
practices until after substantial injury has been done." S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. 27, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
ACT, 1947 at 407,433 (1974). See infra note 41 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the broad discretion exercised by the Board.
4.. The term "e!llployer" is defined as including
any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not
include the United States or any wholly owned Government corporation, or any
Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision thereof, or any corpo
ration or association operating a hospital, if no part of the net ellrnings inures to
the benefit of any private shareholder, or individual, or any person subject to the
Railway Labor Act [45 U.S.c. §§ 151-163, 18'1-188], as'amended from time to
time, or any labor organization (other than when acting as an employer), or any
one acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization.
29 U.S.C: § 152(2) (1982). See infranote 56 and accompanying text for a further discus
sion of the definition of "employer" under the NLRA.
5. The term "employee" is defined as including
347
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Board and court interpretations have become important in determin
ing whether the Board has jurisdiction in a particular instance. 7 These
interpretations, however, are somewhat limited to the ordinary mean
ing of the terms. 8 One area of debate arises when courts consider
whether handicapped workers employed in "sheltered workshops"9
any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer,
unless this subchapter explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any individual
whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current
labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained
any other regular and substantially equivalent employment, but shall not include
any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of
any family or person at his home, or any individual employed by his parent or
spouse, or any individual having the status of an independent contractor, or any
individual employed as a supervisor, or any individual employed by an employer
subject to the Railway Labor Act [45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163, 181-188], as amended
from time to time, or by any other person who is not an employer as herein
defined.
29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982). See infra note 55 and accompanying text for a further discus
sion of the definition of "employee" under the NLRA.
6. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text for the definitions of "employee" and
"employer" under the NLRA. See also NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111
(1944) (the broad language of NLRA definitions indicate that applicability is to be broadly
determined). See infra note 7 and accompanying text for a further discussion of the court's
interpretation of the broad language of the NLRA.
7. See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944). The Supreme Court
stated that
the broad language of the Act's definitions, which ... reject conventional limita
tions on such conceptions as "employee," "employer," and "labor dispute,"
leaves no doubt that its applicability is to be determined broadly ... by underly
ing economic facts rather than technically and exclusively by previously estab
lished legal classifications.
It is not necessary ... to make a completely definitive limitation around the
term "employee." That task has been assigned primarily to the [Board] ....
Id. at 129-30. See also NLRB v: Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. 672, 693 (1980); Allied
Chemical & Alkali Workers of America, Local Union 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,
Chemical Division, 404 U.S. 157, 166-67 (1971). See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying
text for a further discussion of the definitions of "employee" and "employer" under the
NLRA.
8. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1947). The House of Representa
tives stated that:
An "employee," according to all standard dictionaries, according to the law as
the courts have stated it, and according to the understanding of almost everyone,
... means someone who works for another for hire .... It is inconceivable that
Congress, when it passed the act, authorized the Board to give to every word in
the act whatever meaning it wished . . . . Congress intended ... that the Board
give to the words not far-fetched meanings but ordinary meanings.
Id. See also Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers of America, Local Union 1 v. Pittsburgh
.
Plate Glass Co., Chemical Division, 404 U.S. 157, 167-68 (1971).
9. A "sheltered workshop" is defined by the Department of Labor as "a charitable
organization or institution conducted not for profit, but for the purpose of carrying out a
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constitute "employees," or whether the management of these work
shops constitute "employers" within the meaning of the National La
bor Relations Act. 10 Such a determination is neither simple nor
straightforward. The ultimate solution involves balancing many com
peting policies involving labor as a whole and handicapped individuals
as a protected group. Decisions have been made on an ad hoc!! basis.
Thus, decisions and determinations have not provided a stable and
consistent basis for future determinations. At best, these decisions
provide only a few vague tests to be used when considering this issue.
As a result, sheltered workshop employers and their handicapped em
ployees have no guidelines by which to gauge their conduct within the
employer-employee relationship.
The NLRA's broad language, along with the extensive jurisdic
tional power vested in the Board, provide few guidelines for determin
ing which individuals and/or corporations fall within the provisions of
the Act.!2 Thus, jurisdiction over appropriate groups is based on a

recognized program of rehabilitation for handicapped workers, and/or providing such indi
viduals with renumerative employment or other occupational rehabilitating activity of an
educational or therapeutic nature." Employment of Handicapped Clients in Sheltered
Workshops, 29 C.F.R. § 525.2(b) (1988). See infra note 57 and accompanying text for a
further discussion of the Department of Labor's definition of "sheltered workshop."
10. See Sheltered Workshops of San Diego, 126 N.L.R.B. 961 (1960). Sheltered
Workshops of San Diego, Inc. is a nonprofit corporation providing work experience for
physically, mentally, emotionally, and socially disabled persons. Id. The workers are paid
an hourly wage regardless of their production, and many are only part-time employees. Id.
Revenues are derived from sales to profit-making firms, fees for public services for the
handicapped, and donations. Id. San Diego is a certified sheltered workshop, exempt from
minimum wage requirements, and not subject to unemployment compensation laws. Id.
The Board determined that regardless of similarities to an employment relationship, the
emphasis on training, counseling, rehabilitation, and placement tend to establish therapeu
tic assistance rather than employment. Id. Therefore, the Board decided that it was not
necessary to determine whether or not the workshop was an employer under the Act. Id.
The Board viewed the commercial activities as simply a means to an end. Id. See also
Chicago Lighthouse for the Blind, 225 N.L.R.B. 249 (1976) (it effectuated the policies of
the Act for the Board to assert jurisdiction over this employer engaged in the non-retail
performance of services). See infra notes 136-83 and accompanying text for a further dis
cussion of the court's.view of whether handicapped employees in sheltered workshops fall
under the Board's jurisdiction.
11. "Ad hoc" is defined as "[fjor this; for this special purpose." BLACK'S LAW DIC
TIONARY 38 (5th ed. 1979). More broadly it is defined as "made, established, acting, or
concerned with a particular end or purpose." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 26 (1971). In common legal usage, the term is used to distinguish those deci
sions which are, because of their very nature, decided on a case-by-case basis rather than
establishing precise legal guidelines for application in future cases.
12. See infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text for a further discussion of the indi
viduals who fall within the Board's jurisdiction.

350

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11:347

case-by-case inquiry.13 This type of inquiry does not always include
careful consideration of other legislation, policies, or problems which
should be considered in dealing with certain individuals. 14 The handi
capped are a prime example of this situation. Although the language
of the NLRA does not specifically exclude such individuals and their
employers from the Board's jurisdiction, other legislation, policies,
and problems must be considered when the Board makes its determi
nation on the appropriate measures to be taken. In order to effectuate
the policies and purposes of the NLRA, while also furthering the poli
cies and purposes of legislation directed toward handicapped employ
ees, a modified approach must be taken.
Part I of this comment describes the history and development of
the NLRA. Part II then discusses legislation enacted to protect ;md
provide employment and educational assistance to handicapped indi
viduals; it also examines the policies and purposes behind this legisla
tion. Part III reviews and discusses cases arising under the
jurisdiction of the Board, within the setting of a "sheltered workshop"
that employs handicapped individuals. Part IV examines the most re
cent case in the area of handicapped employees in a sheltered work
shop, Arkansas Lighthouse for the Blind v. NLRB.15 Part V compares
and contrasts the· reasoning behi~d the court decisions based upon the
legislation and policies in the area, pointing out the consistencies and
inconsistencies in court r~asoning and conclusions.
Before examining the consistencies and inconsistencies in legisla
tion and case law, this comment first turns to an examination of the
NLRA. An overview of this statute is instrumental in understanding
the role that the Board can and should play in the regulation of shel
tered workshops employing handicapped individuals.
I.

THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT 16

Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act 17 in 1935.
The National Labor Board, now the National Labor Relations Board,
13. See infra notes 25-32 and accompanying text for a further discussion of case-by
case determinations made by the Board.
14. See infra notes 58-136 and accompanying text for further discussion ofiegislation
enacted pertaining to handicapped individuals.
15. 851 F.2d 180 (8th Cir. 1988).
16. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (codified at 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982)).
17. Id.
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was organized under the National Industrial Relief Act lS by Public
Resolution 44.19 Although the Board had the power and machinery to
conduct union elections, it could only report unfair labor violations to
the National Relief Administrator2o or the Department of Justice for
prosecution. 21 Thus, in dealing with recalcitrant employers, the Board
came up against a legal stone wall created by a lack of legal compul
sion to comply with the Board's decision. 22 The Board's findings were
18. National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933). Congress passed
the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) in 1933, nicknamed Labor's Magna Charta,
as a temporary measure in response to widespread unemployment and disorganization of
industry. J. ROSENFARB, THE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY AND How IT WORKS 13 (1940).
The Act authorized the President to establish agencies to effectuate the functions of the
Act. National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, § 2(a), 48 Stat. 195 (1933). Section 7(a) of
the NIRA required that every code of unfair labor competition, agreement, or license ap
proved or issued under the National Industrial Recovery Act state employees' rights to
unionize and to choose whether or not they wished to belong to a union. National Indus
trial Recovery Act, ch. 90, § 7(a), 48 Stat. 195, 198 (1933). On May 27, 1935, the United
States Supreme Court declared the NIRA to be unconstitutional. A.L.A. Schechter Poul
try Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
19. H.R. REP. No. 969, 74thCong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1935). Public Resolution 44 was a
temporary measure taken by Congress in response to the failure of the proposed National
Labor Relations Act to reach the floor of Congress for a vote. Id. Under the Resolution,
Congress authorized the President to establish one or more boards to investigate labor
disputes. National Industrial Recovery Board Establishment, ch. 677,48 Stat. 1183 (1934).
The board(s) were empowered to order and conduct union elections to ensure employees'
rights to organize and select representatives for collective bargaining. Id. In union elec
tions, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals had the right to review the orders of the
board(s). Id. The resolution was to be in effect until June 16, 1935. Id.
20. On August 5, 1933, the President created the National Labor Board in accord
ance with his powers under NIRA. National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195
(1933). The Board, consisting of 20 regional boards, had jurisdiction only over cases in
volving violations of section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act. R. SMITH, L.
MERRIFIELD, & T. ST. ANTOINE, LABOR RELATIONS LAW 34 (5th ed. 1974).
In response to employers questioning the Board's authority, the President issued a
series of executive orders giving the Board the right to adjust certain industrial disputes,
conduct elections, and publish names of representatives; in addition, he ratified the previous·
actions of the Board. Id. This Board ceased to exist on July 9, 1934. Id.
21. H.R. REP. No. 969, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1935). in describing the problems
encountered by the Board prior to the enactment of the NLRA, the House of Representa
tives stated:
All that the National Labor Board could do, if it found a violation ... was to
report the case to the National Recovery Administration, which might take away
the employer's "blue eagle", or to the Department of Justice, which was author
ized to institute, de novo, proceedings in equity or criminal prosecution, under
subsections (c) and (f) of section 3.
Id. at 2.
22. Id. at 3-4. The House of Representatives described the situation as follows:
When a complaint is made to the board of violation ... evidence is heard and
transcribed by the proper regional board established by the National Labor Rela
tions Board. The board has no power to subpoena witnesses or administer oaths.
If the employer chooses to ignore the hearing, he can do so with impunity. . .. If
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given no prima facie weight by the courts in subsequent proceedings,
thereby forcing the Department of Justice to start all investigations
and proceedings anew. 23 Serious conflicts between employees and em
ployers continued to burden, or threaten to burden, the free flow of
commerce and also produced enormous losses in wages, trade, and
commerce. 24
In 1935, Congress enacted the NLRA which gave the Board the
power to investigate violations, make orders in response to any viola
tions, and apply to the court of appeals to enforce such orders. 25 The
extent of the Board's power was to be equal to that of congressional
powers under the commerce clause. 26 Thus, Congress enacted the
the regional board finds a violation ... and the employer fails to comply with its
recommendation for appropriate restitution, the case is referred to the National
Labor Relations Board, which reviews the record. . .. If the [NLRB] confirms
the finding of violation it publishes its finding[ s] ... and announces that unless the
employer in default makes proper restitution it will refer the case to ... National
Recovery Administration, and to other agencies of the Government.
[T]here is no legal compulsion upon the employer to comply. . .. Assuming
[upon transmission] the National Recovery Administration decides to remove the
Blue Eagle, compliance is by no means assured. The nature of the business may
be such that the deprivation of the Blue Eagle has only a negligible effect, in
which case the employer may still ignore the decision. If ... the National Recov
ery Administrator insignia is of substantial value ... [the employer] may apply to
the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia for an injunction restraining the
National Recovery Administration from acting to deprive him of the right to
display such an insignia. These injunction suits are becoming almost routine.

Id.
23. Id. at 4. The House of Representatives stated:
When the Board refers a case to the Department of Justice ... the record made
up by the Board goes for naught, and weeks or more after the alleged violation
the Department must prepare the case for the court, de novo. The Department
does not go into court on the record before the Board to enforce the decision of
the Board; indeed the Board's findings of fact have not even prima facie weight in
subsequent proceedings. . .. [T]he Department in many cases finds it necessary
to make extensive investigations before instituting legal proceedings.
Id.
Id. at 6-7. The House of Representatives stated:
In brief, such obstructions and burdens occur because of the stoppage of the flow
of goods from and into the channels of such commerce, because of the effect on
related or independent industries or establishments, and because of cessation of
employment and wages, sometimes prostrating whole communities or otherwise
impairing such commerce ....
Throughout the period of the operation of the National Industrial Recovery
Act, there existed or were impending serious conflicts burdening or threatening to
burden the free flow of commerce in some of our largest industries ....
Id. at 6.
25. The National Labor Relations Act of 1935, ch. 372,49 Stat. 449.
26. H.R. REP. No. 969, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1935). "In enacting the National
Labor Relations Act, Congress gave and intended to give the Board the fullest possible
24.

1989]

HANDICAPPED EMPLOYEES

353

NLRA to promote equality in bargaining power between employees
and employers, to diminish the causes of labor disputes, and to create
the National Labor Relations Board. 27 The NLRA declares that the
United States' policy is to mitigate and eliminate the causes of substan
tial obstructions to interstate commerce. 28 This national policy is to
be achieved, among other courses of action, by encouraging the prac
tice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting employee
freedom of association, self-organization, and the designation of em
ployee choices for representatives. 29 These representatives are to ne
gotiate the terms and conditions of employment as well as negotiate
for other mutual aid and/or protection. 30 Generally, the act sought
"to make the appropriate collective action (of employees) an instru
ment of peace rather than strife. "31 The Board's jurisdiction is limited
jurisdiction under the commerce clause of the Constitution." NLRB v. Erlich's 814, Inc.,
577 F.2d 68, 70 (8th Cir. 1978). See also NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224
(1963); Polish Nat'l Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643 (1944). Under the commerce clause,
Congress is given the power "to regulate commerce ... among the several states." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Congress' power under the commerce clause has been extended to
intrastate commerce activities when they have such a "close and substantial relation to
interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce
from burdens and obstructions." NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37
(1937). Congress has the "power to regulate the local incidents ... which might have a
substantial and harmful effect upon that commerce." Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964). Congress' power under the commerce clause is
"broad and sweeping; where it keeps within its sphere and violates no express constitu
tional limitation[,] it has been the rule of this Court ... not to interfere." Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 305 (1964). This power need not await disruption of commerce,
but may be exerted to prevent disruption. Id. at 301.
27. H.R. REP. No. 969, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1935). "The inequality in bargain
ing power between employees who do possess full freedom of association of actual liberty of
contract, and employers ... organized in the corporate or other form of ownership ...
burdens and affects the flow of commerce ...." 29 U.S.c. § 151 (1982). It is the "policy of
the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow
of commerce." Id. "The National Labor Relations Board created by this [Act] ... is
continued as an agency of the United States ...." 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1982).
28. 29 U.S.c. § 151 (1982). Congress declared that it is "the policy of the United
States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of com
merce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred." Id.
29. Id. Congress determined that the declared United States policy could be
achieved by "encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by pro
tecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and
designation of representatives of their own choosing." Id.
30. Id.
31. H.R. REP. No. 969, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1935) (quoting Texas & New
Orleans R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood, 281 U.S. 548 (1930». Chairman William M. Leiserson,
of the National Mediation Board observed that
so long as the employers question the right of the employees to hire personnel
managers ... then the employees have to fight for their rights. As soon as the
[employer] began [to be amenable to negotiation] ... the type of labor leader ...
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by denying power over controversies or practices of purely local signif
icance which do not burden or threaten tq burden the free flow of
commerce.32
Section 153 of the NLRA created and established the National
Labor Relations Board (Board).33 The Board is allowed to prosecute
any inquiry necessary to its function 34 in any part of the United
States. 35 The Board also has the authority, as prescribed by the Ad
ministrative Procedure Act,36 to make, amend, and rescind the rules
for the labor people was a more businesslike type, and he is a good deal like the
fellow on the employer's side.
Id. at 7-8.
32. Id. at 9. The House of Representatives stated:
The bill is based squarely on the power of Congress to regulate commerce among
the several States and with foreign nations. It does not apply to controversies or
practices of purely local significance which do not presently or potentially burden
or obstruct the free flow of such commerce.
Id. at 8-9.
33. 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1982). The Board consists of five members, although origi
nally it consisted of three, who are appointed by the President with the advice and consent
of the Senate. Id. The Board is then authorized to delegate to any group of three or more
members any or all of the powers it may exercise. 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1982). The Board is
under an obligation to make an annual report to Congress and the President to summarize
significant case activities and operations. 29 U.S.c. § 153(c) (1982). The principal office of
the Board is in the District of Columbia, however, members may meet and exercise the
Board's powers in any other place. 29 U.S.c. § 155 (1982). The Board shall also have
authority to make, amend, and rescind rules and regulations necessary to carry out the Act,
in accordance with subchapter II of chapter 5 of title 5. 29 U.S.c. § 156 (1982).
34. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1982). The Board is empowered to prevent any person from
engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1982). After a
violation has occurred, the Board shall have the power to issue a complaint with a notice
for hearing. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1982). The Board may amend this complaint, at its dis
cretion, any time prior to issuance of an order based on the complaint. Id. The Board, at
its discretion, may hear testimony and/or arguments. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982). If the
Board finds that anyone named in the complaint engaged in or is engaging in unfair labor
practices, the Board shall issue a cease and desist order or take necessary affirmative action
to effectuate the policies of the Act. Id. Any order may be set aside or modified before itis
filed in a court. 29 U.S.c. § 160(e) (1982). The Board may also petition the court of ap
peals or district court (if on vacation) for enforcement of the order and/or for temporary
relief or a restraining order for unfair labor practices. 29 U.S.c. §§ 160(e) & (j) (1982).
During investigation of unfair labor practices, the Board has access to all evidence of the
person being investigated and has similar powers to those of the judicial department in
holding hearings. 29 U.S.c. § 161(1) (1982). The Board may decline jurisdiction over labor
disputes involving any class or category of employee in which commerce is not sufficiently
or substantially affected to warrant exercise of jurisdiction. 29 U.S.c. § 164(c) (1982).
35. 29 U.S.C. § 155 (1982). See supra note 33 and accompanying text for a discus
sion of the creation and organization of the Board.
36. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1982). This section provides that the agency must give
general notice of rule making unless the new rules are interpretive rules, general statements
of policy, rules of agency organization, procedure or practice or when the agency, for good
cause, believes that such notice is impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to public interest.
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and regulations necessary to carry out the provisions of the Act 37 and
is empowered to prevent unfair labor practices affecting commerce. 38
By enacting the NLRA, Congress intended to give the Board the ful
lest possible jurisdiction over the employee-employer relationship. 39
Judicial review of Board decisions considers factual findings of the
Board conclusive, if supported by substantial evidence in the record as
a whole. 40 Courts give the Board broad discretion in enforcing the
provisions of the ACt. 41 However, the United States Supreme Court,
5 U.S.c. § 553(b) (1982). The agency must also give interested parties an opportunity to
participate in the rule making process and to allow them to petition for issuance, amend
ment, or repeal of a rule. 5 U.S.c. §§ 553(c) & (e) (1982). Further, the publication of a
substantive rule must be made not less than 30 days before its effective date unless other
wise provided for by the section. 5 U.S.c. § 553(d) (1982).
37. 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1982). This section provides that the Board may
make, amend, and rescind, in the manner prescribed by ... the Administrative
Procedure Act, such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions of this subchapter.
Id.
38. 29 U.S.c. § 160(a) (1982). This section, prevention of unfair labor practices,
empowers the Board to
prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice ... affecting com
merce. This power shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or
prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, law or otherwise

Id.
39. The National Labor Relations Act evidences Congress' intent to exercise
whatever constitutionally given power it has to regulate commerce. NLRB v. Fainblatt,
306 U.S. 601, 607 (1939). The Board has jurisdiction as long as the effect on commerce is
more than "de minimis." Id. In enacting the National Labor Relations Act, Congress left
it to the Board as to whether particular practices and situations "adversely affect commerce
when judged by the full reach of the constitutional power of Congress." Polish Nat'l Alli
ance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643, 648 (1944). "The extent to which the Board chooses to
exercise its statutory jurisdiction is a matter of administrative policy within the Board's
discretion ...." NLRB v. WGOK, Inc., 384 F.2d 500,502 (5th Cir. 1967). See supra note
26 and accompanying text.
40. 29 U.S.c. § 160(e) (1982). See also Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S.
474 (1951). The legislation precludes courts from determining the substantiality of evi
dence supporting a Board decision based on evidence which justified it, without looking to
conflicting inferences and evidence. Id. at 487-88. The reviewing court may not override
the Board's decision without looking at the "whole record" or because the court may have
made a different choice. Id. at 488. However, the court is not barred from setting aside a
decision when it cannot conscientiously find substantial evidence, in light of the entire rec
ord, supporting the Board's decision. Id. The Board's findings on questions of fact are
conclusive "when supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole." NLRB v.
Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 691 (1951).
41. See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944). In general, statu
tory interpretation questions are for the courts to decide with adequate weight given to the
administrator's decision. Id. at 130-31. However, in applying broad statutory terms which
the administrator must initially determine, the court has a limited function. Id. at 131.
The Board's determination unqer the Act is accepted if it has" 'warrant in the record' and
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in at least one case, concluded that the Board did not properly exercise
its jurisdiction because its distinction between "completely religious"
and "merely religiously associated," in connection with religious
schools, did not provide a workable guide for the exercise of discretion
due to a degree of entanglement within the two distinctions. 42 Before
sanctioning such decisions, courts must find a clearly expressed affirm
ative congressional intention present. 43
When Congress amended the NLRA in 1947,44 the Senate and
House Reports emphasized the fact that Congress enacted the NLRA
to prescribe fair and equitable rules of conduct between labor and
management in their dealings affecting interstate commerce, to protect
rights of these individual workers in their relations with labor organi
a reasonable basis in law." Id. Due to the complexity of modern industry, Congress real
ized the necessity of these flexible rules and, thus, gave the Board wide discretion in matters
such as shaping the appropriate unit. Id. at 134. The extent to which the Board exercises
its statutory jurisdiction is within its discretion; thus, absent extraordinary circumstances,
determining when and if to exercise this jurisdiction is for the Board, not the court, to
decide. NLRB v. WGOK, Inc., 384 F.2d 500, 502 (5th Cir. 1967). The Board has broad
discretion in determining whether to exercise its statutory jurisdiction. NLRB v. Austin
Developmental Center, Inc., 606 F.2d 785, 790 (7th Cir. 1979). "The Board's decisions
will not be reversed absent a showing that it acted unfairly and caused substantial prejudice
to the affected employers." Id. Although the Board must treat similar cases alike, it may
deviate from prior guidelines to effectuate the purposes of the Act. Id. Courts should be
reluctant to overturn the Board's judgment, substituting their own ideas, without some
compelling evidence that the Board has "failed to measure up to its responsibility." NLRB
v. E. C. Atkins & Co., 331 U.S. 398,414 (1947).
42. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 495 (1979). The Board
certified unions as bargaining agents of teachers in schools operated by the church. Id. at
491. The Board based its jurisdiction on its policy of declining jurisdiction only when
schools are "completely religious" and not "merely religiously associated." Id. at 495. The
United States Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court denied the Board
jurisdiction because its standard "failed to provide a workable guide for the exercise of
discretion." Id. Further, the United States Supreme Court determined that
in the absence of a clear expression of Congress' intent to bring teachers in
church-operated schools within the jurisdiction of the Board, we decline to con
strue the Act in a manner that could in turn call upon the Court to resolve diffi
cult and sensitive questions arising out of the guarantees of the First Amendment
Religion Clauses.
Id. at 507.
43. Id. at 500. The Court indicated that the Board's jurisdiction would be ques
tioned in such cases involving "public questions particularly high in the scale of our na
tional interest." Id. See McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372
U.S. 10, 17 (1963) (Court denied the Board's jurisdiction over foreign seamen). See also
Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957) (Court denied the Board's
jurisdiction over foreign seamen on a foreign vessel docked in an American port, for, if
Congress had intended to include such an important regulation within the Act, it would
have stated as much). Such interference in the delicate area of international relations could
only come from Congress' clearly expressed affirmative intention. Id.
44. Ch. 120, title I, 61 Stat. 136 (1947).
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zations, and to recognize the public interest in labor disputes affecting
commerce because of public health, safety, and welfare considera
tions. 45 During amendment proceedings, the House proposed that the
definition of "employer" be amended to exclude from employer status
"any corporation, community chest, fund, or foundation organized
and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or
educational purposes. , . no part of the net earnings of which inures to
the benefit of any private shareholder or individual."46 The House of
Representatives felt that such organizations were not engaged in inter
state commerce and were, therefore, subject exclusively to local con
trol. 47 The House justified its proposed exclusion by pointing out that
such organizations are not engaged in "commerce" or interstate com
merce,48 frequently assist local governments, and, therefore, should
fall under local jurisdiction. 49 The Senate proposed that the exclusion
45. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. I, reprinted in 1947 U.S. CODE
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 1135, 1135. The House Committee of Conference stated that the
purpose of the amendment of the bill was to
prescribe fair and equitable rules of conduct to be observed by labor and manage
ment in their relations with one another which affect commerce, to protect the
rights of individual workers in their relations with labor organizations whose ac
tivities affect commerce, to recognize the paramount public interest in labor dis
putes affecting commerce that endanger the public health, safety, or welfare, and
for other purposes . . . .

Id.
46. H.R. REP. No. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947 at 158, 161 (1974).
47. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 12, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HIS
TORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947 at 292, 303 (1974). The
House of Representatives observed that
[c]hurches, hospitals, schools, colleges, and societies for the care of the needy are
not engaged in "commerce" and certainly not in interstate commerce. These in
stitutions frequently assist local governments in carrying out their essential func
tions, and for this reason should be subject to exclusive local jurisdiction.

Id.
48. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 32, reprinted in 1947 U.S. CODE
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 1135, 1137. The House of Representatives Committee of Confer
ence stated that
The other nonprofit organizations excluded under the House bill are not specifi
cally excluded in the conference agreement, for only in exceptional circumstances
and in connection with purely commercial activities ... of such organizations or
of their employees been considered as affecting commerce so as to bring them
within the scope of the National Labor Relations Act.

Id.
49. The word "commerce," as used in the Constitution, is equivalent to "intercourse
for the purposes of trade," including transportation, purchase, sale, and exchange of com
modities between citizens of different states. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 298
(1936). Interstate commerce comprehends all component parts of commercial intercourse
between different states. Furst v. Brewster, 282 U.S. 493, 498 (1931).
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include only "nonprofit corporations and associations operating hospi
tals."50 The House Conference Committee agreed with the Senate ex
clusion and indicated that the other nonprofit organizations, excluded
under the House bill, would only "in exceptional circumstances and in
connection with purely commercial activity ... of such organizations
or of their employees" be brought within the jurisdiction of the
NLRA.51 The Senate version of the exclusion was finally adopted.
Congress eliminated this exclusion from the Act in 197452 and re
placed it with special strike notice requirements applicable to such or
ganizations. 53 The Committee reviewing the section determined that
there was no acceptable reason to exclude these particular hospital
employees from the coverage and protection of the NLRA.54
In its present form, the NLRA gives the Board jurisdiction over
"employee(s)." The definition of "employee" includes any employee
except agricultural laborers, domestic servants working at an individ
ual's home, persons employed by a spouse or parent, an independent
contractor, a supervisor, persons employed by an employer subject to
the Railway Labor Act, or persons employed by another person who is

50. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 12, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947 at 292, 303 (1974).
51. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 5\0, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 32, reprinted in 1947 U.S. CODE
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 1135, 1137. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
52. Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395 (1974).
53. 29 U.S.C. § 183 (1982). The provision allows the Director of the Federal Media
tion and Conciliation Service to assist resolution of the impasse, by establishing an impar
tial Board of Inquiry to investigate the issues and make a written report to the parties. Id.
The report is to consist of a finding of facts with recommendations for settling the dispute
in a prompt, peaceful and just manner. Id. The Board of Inquiry appointed shall have no
interest or involvement in the health care institution or employee organization(s) in the
dispute. Id. The provision also provides for the selection and compensation of the Board
of Inquiry. Id. Upon establishment of the Board of Inquiry and for 15 days after the
Board of Inquiry issues its report, the parties shall not change the status quo in effect prior
to the expiration of the contract or the impasse except by agreement. Id. See also S. REP.
No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS
3946,3948.
54. S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo &
ADMIN. NEWS 3946, 3948. The Committee decided that it was "in the public interest to
insure the continuity of health care to the community and the care and well being of pa
tients." Id. at 4, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 3949. Public
interest also demands that employees not be deprived of their statutory rights. Id. The
Committee hoped that "parties to a dispute in such an institution would be cognizant of
such special problems and take steps ... to mitigate the effects of a scarcity of alternative
... resources." Id. at 5, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 3950.
Witnesses stressed the uniqueness of these institutions and the need to avoid disruption. Id.
at 6, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 3951.
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not an employer as defined. 55 An "employer" includes anyone acting
as agent of an employer, but does not include the United States, a
Government corporation, any Federal Reserve Bank, any State or
political subdivision thereof, any person subject to the Railway Labor
Act, or any labor organization, its officers, or agents. 56
An understanding of the NLRA is important in determining
whether handicapped employees in sheltered workshops 57 come
within the jurisdiction of the Board. Other factors in consideration of
handicapped employees' claims must also be considered. Handi
capped individuals encounter special problems, unique to this pro
tected group, which must be addressed. Congress has enacted special
legislation which provides special protections to the handicapped in
various ways. Part II of this comment focuses on this legislation and
provides an overview of significant congressional action in this area.
II.

LEGISLATIVE PROTECTION AND FURTHERANCE OF
HANDICAPPED INDIVIDUALS

Congress enacted several statutory provisions in an effort to en
courage self improvement and rehabilitation of the handicapped while
still providing them with some extent of protection. 58 These statutes
provide a basis for encouraging and controlling the development of
handicapped individuals, enabling them to become more productive
citizens. These legislative enactments provide an important basis for
understanding congressional problems and goals as they relate to the
handicapped.

55. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982). See supra note 5 and accompanying text for a defini
tion of "employee" under the NLRA.
56. 29 U.S.c. § 152(2) (1982). See supra note 4 and accompanying text (or a defini
tion of "employer" under the NLRA.
57. See supra note 9 and accompanying text for the Department of Labor's definition
of "sheltered workshop."
58. Such provisions include: Wagner-O'Day Act, ch. 697, 52 Stat. 1196 (1938)
(codified at 41 U.S.c. §§ 46-48 (1982», see infra notes 59-75 and accompanying text for a
further discussion; Fair Labor Standards Act, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified at 29
U.S.c. §§ 201-219 (1982», see infra notes 76-105 and accompanying text for a further
discussion; Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 357 (codified at 29
U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1982», see infra notes 106-24 and accompanying text for a further
discussion; Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 3 (codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 1
9501 (1982», see infra notes 125-35 and accompanying text for a further discussion.

360

A.

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11:347

The Wagner-O'Day Act 59

Congress enacted the Wagner-O'Day Act 60 in 1938 to promote
sheltered workshops for the blind, which were not-for-profit opera
tions' providing work for sightless persons. 61 The Senate noted that
these types of workshops prevent sightless individuals from becoming
public charges. Congress believed that the government should spare
no effort to aid and assist these individuals by means other than relief
grants. 62 The statute was enacted to broaden the limited market for
products produced in these workshops and, thereby, provide more job
opportunities for the blind. 63 In 1971, Congress expanded the Act64 to
increase employment opportunities for all handicapped individuals
and to promote employment of the blind and severely handicapped. 65
Congress hoped that some of these individuals would acquire sufficient
job skills to enable them to enter the competitive job market. 66 Con
gress ultimately wanted to provide the blind and severely handicapped
with skills making them more placeable in private industry, thereby
turning these public assistance recipients into wage earners and tax
payers.67 Congress also addressed concerns about the relationship be
tween these handicapped workers, their workshops, and their fringe
benefits. The concerns included unemployment benefits, Social Secur
59. 41 U.S.C. §§ 46-48 (1982).
60. Wagner-O'Day Act, ch. 697, 52 Stat. 1196 (1938) (codified at 41 U.S.c. §§ 46-48
(1982».
61. S. REP. No. 1330, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1938). The Senate referred to "several
sheltered workshops for the blind ... which afford to some 3,000 sightless persons produc
tive work." Id. These workshops are "not operated for profit." Id.
62. Id. The Senate encouraged such action because "[t]he employment thus fur
nished prevents workmen so engaged from becoming public charges." Id. See infra note
63 and accompanying text.
63. Id. The Senate provided that, after supplies from the Federal prisons were no
longer available, "the Government [would] be required to purchase their brooms as well as
mops from nonprofit-making agencies for the blind." Id. Their purchases would also ex
tend to "other suitable commodities produced by the blind where the procurement of such
commodities is not presently required" by another law. Id. The Senate also recognized
that "opportunities for gainful employment to those ... with blindness are limited" and
that "the Government should spare no effort to aid and assist them by means other than a
relief grant." Id.
64. Pub. L. No. 92-28, 85 Stat. 77 (1971).
65. Committee for Purchase from the Blind and Other Severely Handicapped, 41
C.F.R. § 51-1.1(a) (1988).
66. H.R. REP. No. 228, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 21, reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE CONGo
& ADMIN. NEWS 1079, 1093. Relative to the House of Representatives Report, the United
States Department of Labor Report stated that the legislation was consistent "with the
Department's objective to promote employment of the handicapped. Hopefully, it will as
sist some of the severely handicapped to acquire sufficient job-skill proficiency to enter a
competitive job situation." Id.
67. Id. at 1080.
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ity, and worker's compensation. Congress suggested that the Commit
tee investigate these concerns. 68
The Committee for Purchase from the Blind and Other Severely
Handicapped 69 was created by the Wagner-O'Day Act to oversee gov
ernment purchases from the blind and other severely handicapped in
dividuals 70 employed in qualified nonprofit agencies7l for the blind and
severely handicapped. 72 The Act requires the government, or govern
68. [d. at 1085. Congress stated that:
This Committee's examination of the program has revealed another area of Con
gressional concern, namely, the need to explore the relationship of the handi
capped workers and their workshops to fringe benefits . . . . The Committee
believes that studies of policies and practices of workshops with respect to . . .
[fringe benefits] should be undertaken promptly by the Department of Labor or in
cooperation with appropriate agencies.
[d.
69. Committee for Purchase from the Blind and Other Severely Handicapped, 41
C.F.R. § 51-2 (1988).
70. 41 U.S.C. §§ 46-47 (1982).
71. A "qualified nonprofit agency for the blind" is defined as
an agency organized under the laws of the United States or of any State, operated
in the interest of blind individuals, and the net income of which does not inure in
whole or in part to the benefit of any shareholder or other individual; which com
plies with applicable occupational health and safety standards prescribed by the
Secretary of Labor; and which in the production of commodities and the provi
sion of services (whether or not the commodities or services are procured under
these regulations) during the fiscal year employs blind individuals for not less
than 75 percent of the man-hours of direct labor required for the production or
provision of the commodities or services.
Committee for Purchase from the Blind and Other Severely Handicapped, 41 C.F.R. § 51
l.2(h) (1988). A "qualified nonprofit agency for other severely handicapped" is defined as
an agency organized under the laws of the United States or of any State, operated
in the interests of severely handicapped individuals who are not blind, and the net
income of which does not inure in whole or in part to the benefit of any share
holder or other individual; which complies with applicable occupational health
and safety standards prescribed by the Secretary of Labor; and which in the pro
duction of commodities and the provision of services (whether or not the com
modities or services are procured under these regulations) during the fiscal year
employs severely handicapped individuals for not less than 75 percent of the man
hours of direct labor required for the production or provision of the commodities
or services.
Committee for Purchase from the Blind and Other Severely Handicapped, 41 C.F.R.
§ 51.1.2(i) (1988).
72. 41 U.S.c. § 47 (1982). The Committee is given the responsibility to "establish
and. publish in the Federal Register a [procurement] list." 41 U.S.C. § 47(a)(I) (1982).
The Committee also "shall designate a central nonprofit agency or agencies to facilitate the
distribution ... for commodities and services on the procurement list among qualified
nonprofit agencies for the blind or ... other severely handicapped." 41 U.S.c. § 47(c)
(1982). It shall conduct "a continuing study and evaluation of its activities ... for the
purpose of assuring effective and efficient administration ... of this title." 41 U.S.C.
§ 47(e) (1982). The studies and evaluations address problems related to employment of the
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ment agency, to procure a commodity or service on the procurement
list from a blind or handicapped nonprofit agency, if available within
the period needed,73 unless under a section 412174 exception. 75
The Wagner-O'Day Act is but one example of congressional in
tent to provide special protections to the handicapped. The Fair La
bor Standards Act is another provision which further evidences
Congress' intent to protect the handicapped.
B.

The Fair Labor Standards Act 76

Since its original enactment in 1938, the Fair Labor Standards
Act has promoted economic justice and security for the lowest paid
workers, created employment stability, and eliminated unfair competi
tive labor practices. 7s The policy of the Act is to correct and eliminate
labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of minimum stan
dards of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well~being
of workers without substantially curtailing employment or earning
power. 79
77

Upon receipt of a certificate issued by the Administrator of the
Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor,so the original
act allowed subminimum rates to be paid to specified groups, inchid
blind and handicapped and the development and adaptation of production methods en
abling greater utilization of the handicapped. 41 U.S.c. § 47(e) (1982).
73. 41 U.S.C. § 48 (1982). The government offices which order procurement list
commodities and services obtain them from either the central nonprofit agency or the des
ignated workshop. Committee for Purchase from the Blind and Other Severely Handi
capped, 41 C.F.R. § 51-5.1-1 (1988). When the central nonprofit agency receives an order,
it designates the workshop(s) that will produce the commodity orservice. 41 C.F.R: § 51
5.1-2(a) (1988). The central nonprofit agency may also authorize the ordering officer to
order directly from the workshop. 41 C.F.R. § 51-5.1-2(c) (1988). Under specified circum
stances, the central nonprofit agency shall grant a purchase exception to the ordering office.
41 C.F.R. § 51-5.2 (1988). The exception allows the ordering office to procure the com
modity or service from a commercial source. Id.
74. 18 U.S.C. § 4121 (1982). This provision creates Federal Prison Industries, Inc.
Prison-made products, under the provisions, are to be purchased by Federal departments
and Government institutions of the United States when such products meet their require
ments and may be available. 18 U.S.C. § 4124 (1982). The products must be produced in
the industries authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 4121. Id.
75. 41 U.S.C. § 48 (1982).
76. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982).
77. Fair Labor Standards Act, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 201-219 (1982».
78. S. REP. No. 640, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in 1949 U.S. CODE CONGo &
ADMIN. NEWS 2241, 2241.
.
79. 29 U.S.C. § 202 (1982).
80. 29 C.F.R. § 525.2(a) (1987). The Administrator is appointed by the President,
with the advice and consent of the Senate. 29 U.S.C. § 204(a) (1982). The Administrator
submits an annual report to Congress including information, data, and recommendations
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ing handicapped workers.8) The Act was amended in 1961 in re
sponse to questions raised about the adequacy of minimum wage
protection for handicapped employees, especially those in sheltered
workshops.82 When the Secretary of Labor grants a sheltered work
shop certificate to an individual workshop, it specifies minimum opera
tional requirements, but leaves workshop managers with broad
discretion in deciding appropriate wage rates. 83 This rate may fall
somewhere between certificate minimum 84 and statutory minimum. 85
The Senate observed that the procedure, although flexible, permitted
abuse at the expense of the handicapped. 86 The Senate also noted that
there were complaints that these wages were inadequate, allowing
which he finds advisable for legislation connected with the Fair Labor Standards Act that
he finds advisable. 29 U.S.C. § 204(d)(I) (1982).
81. 29 U.S.C. § 214(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See also Walling v. Portland Termi
nal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 151-52 (1947) (employers of the handicapped must pay them mini
mum wage, unless a permit or certificate allowing them not to pay minimum wage is
obtained from the Administrator).
82. S. REP. No. 145, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 45, reprinted in 1961 U.S. CODE CONGo &
ADMIN. NEWS 1620, 1665.
83. Employment of Handicapped Clients in Sheltered Workshops, 29 C.F.R. § 525
(1987). A sheltered workshop is defined as a "charitable organization or institution con
ducted not for profit but for the purpose of carrying out a recognized program of rehabilita
tion ... or other occupational rehabilitating activity of educational or therapeutic nature"
for handicapped workers. 29 C.F.R. § 525.2(b) (1987). In issuing a special certificate for a
sheltered workshop, the Administrator may consider certain specified criterion, including
but not limited to, present or past earnings of the handicapped workers; whether wages are
commensurate with those paid to nonhandicapped workers in the vicinity for like work;
nature and extent of the disabilities involved; wages of comparable work in private indus
try; types and duration of other rehabilitative services given to handicapped workers; extent
of worker's previous experience; and whether the organization is exempt under section
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code and has registered as a non-profit organization. 29
C.F.R. § 525.7 (1987). The regulations also establish requirements for those operating
under such certificates as well as grounds for review or revocation of said certificates. 29
C.F.R. § 525 (1987). See supra note 9 and accompanying text for a complete definition of
"sheltered workshop."
84. 29 U.S.c. § 214(c) (1982 & Supp. IV. 1986). The Secretary issues special certifi
cates to those who employ handicapped individuals-thereby allowing them to pay wages
to such individuals that are lower than statutory minimum wag.e; commensurate to wages
paid to nonhandicapped employees in the same vicinity doing the same type, quality and
quantity of work; and related to productivity. 29 U.S.C. § 214(c)(I) (Supp. IV 1986). No
employer can reduce this certificate wage rate for at least two years without prior authori
zation of the Secretary. 29 U.S.c. § 214(c)(3) (Supp. IV 1986). See also Walling v. Port
land Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148 (1947) (discussing the necessity of obtaining a certificate
before being authorized to pay handicapped employees less than minimum wage).
85.29 U.S.c. § 206 (1982).
86. S. REP. No. 145, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 46, reprinted in 1961 U.S. CODE CONGo &
ADMIN. NEWS 1620, 1665. Congress observed that "subminimum rates ... while com
mendably flexible, also obviously permits ready abuse at the expense of handicapped work
ers, particularly in the absence of a vigorous investigation and enforcement program." Id.
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these workshops to undercut competitive industry.87 The Senate sug
gested that either an administrative or, if need be, a statutory remedy
could be used to curb these abuses. 88 Later, Congress incorporated its
own handicapped employee minimum wage requirement. 89 The re
quirement provided a wage of not less than fifty percent of the statu
tory minimum wage, commensurate with those wages paid to
nonhandicapped employees who have the same type, quality, and
quantity of work in the same vicinity and with the same productivity
level.90 Congress established these requirements in order to improve
the economic standards of the handicapped, assure their rapid ad
vancement into private industry, and to reduce exploitation through
wages. 91 In 1986, in response to the increasingly large number of se
verely handicapped individuals employed by sheltered workshops,
Congress amended the Act92 by eliminating the fifty percent of mini
mum wage provision and providing wage review procedures. 93 Con
gress enacted the amendment "to provide a more rational, fair and
objective basis for determining wages to be paid to handicapped em
ployees with impaired productivity while fully protecting the rights of
individual workers."94 Because sheltered workshop employers are
given great management flexibility, Congress intended to ensure that
handicapped workers would receive procedural due process protection
87. S. REP. No. 145, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 46, reprinted in 1961 U.S. CODE CONGo &
ADMIN. NEWS 1620, 1665. The Senate observed that with the substantial growth in the
number of sheltered workshops, workshops are able to significantly undercut competitive
industries which are obligated to pay their workers minimum wage. Id.
88. Id. The Senate felt that while wage rates in sheltered workshops were "com
mendably flexible, [it] also obviously permits ready abuse at the expense of handicapped
workers." Id. The Senate felt that "more satisfactory standards can be accomplished
through administrative machinery now functioning." Id. If this method did not succeed,
the Senate hoped "to explore and develop formal statutory standards to assure adequate
minimum wage protection for all handicapped persons." Id.
89. 29 U.S.C. § 214(c) (1982).
90. Fair Labor Standards Act, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938).
91. S. REP. No. 1487, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONGo &
ADMIN. NEWS 3002, 3025. The Senate stated that it believed that the amendment "serves
the purpose of improving the economic circumstances of handicapped workers, speeding
their movement into fully productive private employment, and assuring that such workers
are not exploited through low wages." Id.
92. Pub. L. No. 99-486, 100 Stat. 1229 (1986).
93. See infra notes 97-105 and accompanying text for discussion of procedure.
94. 132 CONGo REC, S13,860 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1986) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
The amendment was also drafted to allow for "procedural due process safeguards for hand
icapped employees who are paid under special minimum wage rate certificates." Id. This
due process protection was thought to be necessary to protect "this vulnerable sector of our
work force." Id. Included with the joint statement in the Record are letters supporting the
amendment from associations involved in the servicing and employment of the handi
capped. Id.
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guaranteeing wages commensurate with productivity.95 Congress
hoped that, by enacting the present legislation, workers would be
guaranteed wages according to individual productivity while reducing
the employers' paperwork enough to allow for concentration on im
proving client services. 96 Congress hoped that employer's concentra
tion on services would aid and further the positions of the
handicapped.
In order to prevent curtailment of opportunities for employment
of certain specified individuals, the Fair Labor Standards Act97 allows
the Secretary of Labor, by regulation or order, to provide for the em
ployment of, among others, individuals "whose earning or productive
capacity is impaired by age, physical or mental deficiency."98 The Sec
retary shall allow wages paid to such individuals to be "lower than the
minimum wage applicable under section 206,"99 "commensurate with
those paid to nonhandicapped workers" for the same type, quality and
quantity in the same vicinity,IOO and "related to the individual's pro
95. 132 CONGo REC. H8825 (daily ed. Oct. I, 1986) (statements of Rep. Murphy).
Representative Murphy stated that:
Since we are granting employers greater flexibility to manage their handi
capped enterprises, it is absolutely essential that we preserve protections for hand
icapped workers which guarantees wages commensurate with their productivity.
Thus, H.R. 5614 provides a necessary procedural due process safeguard for hand
icapped workers who are paid under special minimum wage rate certificates ....
This due process protection is an essential element in the compromise legisla
tion before us and will hopefully insure against exploitation of this vulnerable
sector of our workforce.
Id.
96. 132 CONGo REc. H8826 (daily ed. Oct. I, 1986) (statements of Rep. Petri). Rep
resentative Petri observed that:
The intent of the bill is to rationalize and simplify the administration of shel
tered workshops, not to lower or change what anyone is paid. The current system
of multiple certificates has been called an administrative nightmare .... By mak
ing these improvements ... we can free both the Labor Department and the
workshops to spend more of their time on improving services to clients ....
. . . These [special] provisions allow employment opportunities for handi
capped persons who would not be able to compete for jobs in the regular labor
marketplace if the regular minimum wage had to be paid.
Id.
97. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982).
98. 29 U.S.C. § 214(c)(I) (Supp. IV 1986).
99. 29 U.S.C. § 214(c)(I)(A) (Supp. IV 1986).
100. 29 U.S.c. § 214(c)(I)(B) (Supp. IV 1986). Representative Murphy emphasized
the necessity of this standard in the statute by explaining that since Congress is "granting
employers greater flexibility to manage their handicapped enterprises [by eliminating the
fifty percent of minimum wage floor], it is absolutely essential that we preserve protections
for handicapped workers which guarantees wages commensurate with their productivity."
132 CONGo REc. H8825 (daily ed. Oct. I, 1986) (statements of Rep. Murphy). See supra
note 95 and accompanying text.
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ductivity."101 Employers qualifying under this section must provide
written assurances that wages will be reviewed every six months and
adjusted at least once a year, to reflect wages paid to comparable non
handicapped employees,102 a,nd must not reduce the wages of a handi
capped individual for two years without prior authorization of the
Secretary.103 Any employee or guardian of the employee may petition
the Secretary to initiate a review of the wage rate. 104 Under the Act,
employers are not prohibited from "maintaining or establishing work
activities centers to provide therapeutic activities for handicapped
clients." 105
Although the Fair Labor Standards Act focused on stabilizing
and assuring a wage level for handicapped employees, other issues in
the handicapped empioyment situation needed to be addressed. Con
gress enacted the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 in response to these addi
tional issues and concerns.
C.

The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 106

Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to promote vo
cational rehabilitation and more independent living through, among
other programs, employment of the handicapped. 107 The state
101. 29 U.S.C. § 214(c)(I)(C) (Supp. IV 1986). See supra notes 95 & 100 and accom
panying text.
102. 29 U.S.c. § 214(c)(2) (Supp. IV 1986). The provision provides that the Secre
tary of Labor
shall not issue a certificate ... unless the employer provides written assurances to
the Secretary that ... wages paid ... will be reviewed by the employer at periodic
intervals at least once every six months, and ... will be adjusted by the employer
at periodic intervals, at least once each year, to reflect changes in the prevailing
wage paid to experienced non handicapped individuals employed in the locality
for essentially the same type of work.
Id.
103. 29 U.S.C. § 214(c)(3) (Supp. IV 1986). Sheltered workshops are restricted fur
ther for "no employer shall be permitted to reduce the hourly wage rate prescribed by
certificate under this subsection ... of any handicapped individual for a period of two years
from such date without prior authorization of the Secretary." Id.
104. 29 U.S.c. § 214(c)(5) (Supp. IV 1986). The Secretary must determine if the
wage is justified in the particular circumstance. Id. If the petition is brought, the employer
has the burden of proving the wage is necessary in order to prevent curtailment of employ
ment opportunities. 29 U.S.c. § 214(c)(5)(c) (Supp. IV 1986).
105. 29 U.S.c. § 214(c)(4) (Supp. IV 1986).
106. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 357 (codified at 29
U.S.C. §§ 70l-796i (1982».
107. S. REP. No. 318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONGo &
ADMIN. NEWS 2076, 2079. The Committee sought to "improve in every possible respect
the lives as well as livelihood of [handicapped] individuals served." Id. The Act not only
was intended to promote a "better basic progran:t of service" but also was "designed to
focus research and training activities on making employment and participation in society
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agency lO8 involved is required to place handicapped individuals in em
ployment or training whenever possible and to review and evaluate
periodically the status of handicapped individuals placed in extended
employment in rehabilitation facilities, like sheltered workshops.109
The review is designed to determine the feasibility of the employment
in the competitive labor market. I 10 Under the Act, the federal govern
ment is authorized to review and amend state programs whenever it
deems it necessary for enforcement of the policies and purposes of the
Act. 111 Vocational rehabilitation goods and services necessary for the
employment of the handicapped include training and recruitment
services as well as providing new employment for handicapped indi
viduals. 1I2 Group rehabilitation may be in the form of public or non
profit facilities and services that promise to contribute substantially to
the rehabilitation of the group. I 13
The Rehabilitation Act was created to develop and implement
prqgrams of vocational rehabilitation and independent living. 114 The
legislation is intended to improve every possible aspect of the lives and
livelihoods of the handicapped and other individuals II 5 through serv
ices responsive to each individual's needs as well as ensuring that no
individual, especially the severely handicapped, would be excluded. I 16
Although not possible in many cases, the ultimate goal of the Act is to
more feasible for handicapped individuals." Id. at 19, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONGo
& ADMIN. NEWS at 2092.

108. 29 u.s.c. § 721 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). To qualify to participate, a state is
required to submit to the Commissioner a three-year plan for vocational rehabilitation. Id.
The plan has to "designate a State agency as the sole State agency to administer ... or to
supervise" administration of the plan. Id. The Act further designates specific qualifica
tions and requirements for each segment of the handicapped population. Id.
109. 29 u.s.c. § 721(a)(16) (Supp. IV 1986).
110. Id.
Ill. 29 u.s.c. § 721(a)(19) (1982).
112. 29 U.S.C. § 723(a)(7) (Supp. IV 1986).
113. 29 U.S.C. § 723(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1986).
114. 29 U.S.C. § 701 (Supp. IV 1986).
115. S. REP. No. 318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONGo &
ADMIN. NEWS 2076,2079.
116. Id. at 5, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 2079. Con
gress attempted to develop a
method of providing services which would be responsive to individual needs and
would ensure that no individual would be excluded from the program merely
because his handicap appeared to be too severe. The Committee thus expanded
the range of services to be provided and sought to assure that there would be a
first priority to serve those individuals with the most severe handicaps.
Id. Congress indicated "the new thrust of the bill [is] that individuals who apply for serv
ices must be given every opportunity to achieve a vocational goal." Id. at 19, reprinted in
1973 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 2092. See supra note 107 and accompanying
text.
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prepare individuals for work in competitive industry and to allow a
more independent life,117 emphasizing the view that a productive and
financially independent life is desirable. I IS
The 1973 revisions of the Rehabilitation Act sought to provide
more complete and comprehensive services for a large number of the
severely handicapped by setting up a committee to study the role and
running of sheltered workshops employing the handicapped. 119 The
1974 amendments to the Rehabilitation Act included a provision
White House Conference on Handicapped Individuals Act-allowing
the President to call a conference l2o to focus greater public attention
on the problems and needs of these individuals and to vitalize the com
mitment of the United States to overcome these problems. 121 The Act
was revised in 1978 122 in order to provide more extensive employment
opportunities for the handicapped. 123 Such programs include provid
ing a community service program for employment of the handicapped
and entering jointly financed projects with private industry for on-the
job training and employment for the handicapped. 124
Congress has addressed and incorporated protections and privi
leges for sheltered workshops and other charitable organizations in
117. Id. at 19, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 2092. While
Congress wishes the programs in the Act to "remain vocationally oriented, it does not
believe that there are handicapped individuals whose handicaps are so severe, or because of
other circumstances, such as age, that they may never achieve employment. The Commit
tee feels that they should not be denied services." Id. Congress strived to find methods so
that "such individuals may gain entrance to the vocational rehabilitation program or may
be enabled to live more independently." Id. at 19, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONGo &
ADMIN. NEWS at 2093. The amendments to this Act expand "comprehensive rehabilita
tion services to enable individuals for whom a vocational goal was not presently possible to
prepare to live more independently." Id. at 5, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD
MIN. NEWS at 2079. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
118. Id. at 5, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 2079. See
supra note 107 and accompanying text.
119. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 357. This amendment
is just one of the examples of the numerous amendments of the Rehabilitation Act since its
original enactment as the Smith-Fees Act in 1920. S. REP. No. 318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 9,
reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 2076, 2082. Although originally
concerned with veterans, the Act has progressively changed and modified in order to serve
a larger and more diversified group of individuals with more expansive service and pro
grams. Id.
120. Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-516, 88 Stat. 1617,
1631-34.
121. S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 51, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo
& ADMIN. NEWS 6373, 6401.
122. Pub. L. No. 95-602,92 Stat. 2955 (1978).
123. H.R. REP. No. 1149, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 7312, 7312-13.
124. Id.
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more generalized statutory enactments. These protections and privi
leges indicate a congressional concern for such organizations and the
individuals they serve.
D.

The Internal Revenue Code 125

Incentives and protections for the handicapped and sheltered
workshops have also been provided for within the federal income tax
system. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has exempted certain
corporations fro~ paying taxes, 126 including those corporations organ
ized and operated exclusively for charitable purposes, where no part of
the net earnings are for the benefit of any private shareholder or indi
vidual and where no activity attempting to influence legislation or a
political campaign exists. 127 Sheltered workshops have qualified under
this definition of the exempt corporation. 128
This "charitable purpose" exemption was originally introduced
into the Internal Revenue Code prior to the Reform Act of 1939 129
and has remained intact. l3O The 1954 enactment l3l was developed
through extensive and lengthy study of the ways and means to remove
tax inequities and restraints, increase employment, and produce a
125. 26 U.S.c. §§ 1-9501 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
126. 26 U.S.C. § SOl (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
127. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
128. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the courts have determined that simi
lar organizations have qualified as exempt organizations under § 501(c)(3). The IRS stud
ied a nonprofit organization which operated a number of community programs, including
classes, counseling services, and job training, which centered around the manufacture and
sale of a product. Rev. Rul. 73-128, 1973-1 I.R.B. 222. These programs provided unskilled
and unemployed individuals with skills which eventually enabled them to obtain permanent
employment. Id. The IRS determined that the organization qualified for the exemption
since its operations accomplished a charitable purpose. Id. The determinative question is
whether the organization's operation of its manufacturing facilities is a means of accom
plishing the charitable purpose or merely an end in itself. Id. "Providing vocational train
ing and guidance to the unskilled and under-employed ... may qualify as a charitable
purpose so long as the manner of its achievement is otherwise charitable." Id. at 223.. A
charitable tax exemption under § 501(c)(3) depends on common-law standards of charity
by serving a public purpose and is not to be contrary to established public policy. Bob
Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586 (1983). These exemptions are justified
because the exempt entity confers a public benefit which the society or community may not
choose or be able to provide or which supplements and advances work of public institutions
supported by tax revenues. Id. at 591. Further, a corporation that was organized to oper
ate a camp and services for the deaf and that realized a profit which was devoted to mainte
nance of its operations was exempt for income tax purposes. Jack Little Found. for Aid to
Deaf v. Jones, 102 F. Supp. 326 (W.D. Okla. 1951).
129. Internal Revenue Code of 1939, Pub. Act. No.1, H. R. 2762.
130. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONGo
& ADMIN. NEWS 4025, 4025.
131. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 3.
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higher standard of living. \32 However, abuse of the exempt status
prompted Congress, in 1969,133 to enact pro.visions to tighten permis
sive activities of private foundations-to prevent self dealing between
the foundation and its contributors, to require distribution of income
for charitable purposes, to limit holdings of private businesses, and to
assure that activities are restricted as provided by the exemption. 134
Congress attempted to achieve, through these and other revisions, a
fair and more efficient tax system. 135
All of these statutory provisions seem to indicate a congressional
concern of protection of the handicapped. This apparent concern,
however, has not been specifically incorporated into the NLRA. As a
result, courts have applied various interpretations in determining
whether handicapped individuals in sheltered workshops are "employ
ees" within the NLRA and, thus, within the jurisdiction of the Board.
III.

CASE HISTORY INVOLVING THE DEFINITION OF "EMPLOYEE"
WITHIN THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT

A.

The Chicago Lighthouse for the Blind136

An early Board decision interpreting the word "employee" as de
fined in the NLRA 137 involved the Chicago Lighthouse for the Blind.
The Chicago Lighthouse is a northern Illinois nonprofit organization
that serves the blind community through fifteen different programs,
including ad~issions and evaluations, vocational job placement in the
community, work adjustment, and on-the-job training which prepares
blind persons to move into competitive job situations. The work ad
justment and on-the-job training is done in an assembly and packaging
sheltered workshop, which subcontracts with several private employ
ers.138 The job training and counseling program lasts about twelve
weeks, at the end of which time the employee is ready for competitive
employment. The workshop, however, continues to employ these in
dividuals until an opportunity in the private sector occurs. In one
year, the organization's total income was about $1,600,000.00; of this
132. Id.
133. Pub. L. No. 91-172,83 Stat. 492 (1969).
134. H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONGo
& ADMIN. NEWS 1645, 1648.
135. S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONGo &
ADMIN. NEWS 2027, 2028.
136. 225 N.L.R.B. 249 (1976).
137. See supra notes 5 & 55 and accompanying text for an explanation of the word
"employee" under the NLRA.
138. The Chicago Lighthouse for the Blind, 225 N.L.R.B. 249,249 (1976).
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amount, a little over $500,000.00 came from private subcontracts; and
the rest came from Government and private grants, donations, and .
funds. 139
The petitioner, a union, sought to represent a unit consisting of
the employees and clients of the Chicago Lighthouse's two facilities.
The Regional Director concluded that the Chicago Lighthouse's activ
ities are "intimately connected with [ ] educating and training blind
persons to enhance their employment opportunities in the outside
community and thus are noncommercial." The Regional Director re
fused to assert ju!isdiction and allow the unionization of the
organization. 140
The Board, in accordance with the St. Aloysius decision, 141 re
fused to deny jurisdiction based solely on the charitable function or
worthy purpose. It instituted a policy to classify such employers ac
cording to what they do in order to determine whether the Board may
assert jurisdiction. The Board determined that this employer, for all
intents and purposes, was engaged in the nonretail performance of
services. The Board asserted jurisdiction over the employees based on
the St. Aloysius decision and determined that, because the organization
derived a substantial amount of money from private subcontracts, it
effectuated the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction. 142
B.

NLRB v. Lighthouse for the Blind of Houston 143

Lighthouse for the Blind of Houston is a nonprofit, charitable
corporation that provides services and programs for the visually im
paired. Among these programs and services is the operation of work
shops and services for the community. The corporation supports these
139.

Id.
Id.
141. The Rhode Island Catholic Orphan Asylum, 224 N.L.R.B. 1344 (1976). The
St. Aloysius court addressed the issue of whether a nonprofit institution was an "employer"
within the meaning of the NLRA. Id. Although, traditionally, the Board had declined to
assert jurisdiction over this type of employer simply because of its nonprofit status and its
noncommercial activities closely related to a charitable purpose, the Board decided that,
due to removal of the health care exemption from the NLRA definition of "employer," the
only basis for declining jurisdiction over charitable organizations was a finding of insuffi
cient impact on interstate commerce. Id. at 1344-45. The Board interpreted Congress'
deletion as eliminating the distinction between profit and nonprofit institutions and, thus,
eliminating the distinction between charitable and noncharitable organizations. Id. at
1345. Chairman Murphy, in his dissenting opinion, felt that Congress intended such orga
nizations to be exempt from jurisdiction unless they had a "substantial" impact on com
merce. Id. at 1347. Murphy based this interpretation on legislative history. Id.
142. The Chicago Lighthouse for the Blind, 225 N.L.R.B. at 250.
143. 696 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1983).
140.
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programs through state and federal funding and profits from work
shops "A" and "B".I44 Workshop "A" operates at a fairly substantial
profit and is not supported by public or private funds. 145 Workshop
"B" consists of severely handicapped employees who are paid fifty per
cent of minimum wage; while workshop "A" consists of ninety per
cent blind individuals who are paid wages reflecting productivity,
beginning at least at minimum wage. Employees are given merit in
creases and provided with worker's compensation, unemployment,
and hospital insurance. Workshop "A" also provides pension rights,
paid holidays, vacations, sick leave, and overtime. A system of pro
gressive discipline is used for low productivity, improper performance,
and tardiness. No formal employee placement in private industry is
provided; however, three to four employees are annually placed on an
ad hoc basis. Many of the employees are employed for ten to twenty
year periods. 146
A union had been duly certified as the exclusive bargaining repre
sentative of the Houston Lighthouse's employees, but the Houston
Lighthouse refused to bargain collectively with the union. The Re
gional Director supervised the election of the union, claiming that the
Board had jurisdiction over Houston Lighthouse with respect to per
sons employed in its workshop. In response, Houston Lighthouse filed
a request for review arguing that the Regional Director had departed
from Board precedent and that the Board had improperly asserted ju
risdiction over institutions such as Houston Lighthouse. The Board
affirmed the Director's decision and determined that it effectuated the
purposes of the Act to assert jurisdiction and that the Houston Light
house's clients were "employees" under the NLRA.147
The Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals upheld the
Board decision that these individuals were "employees" within the
meaning of the NLRA.148 The decision hinged on a determination of
whether the essential nature of the workshop was "rehabilitative"149
or "typically industrial."150 The Board decided not to assert jurisdic
tion over those operations that were primarily rehabilitative or thera
peutic in function, but rather, to assert jurisdiction over those
144.
145.
146.

147.
148.
notes 5 &
149.

Id. at 401-02.
Id. at 406.
Id. at 403.
Lighthouse for the Blind of Houston, 248 N.L,R.B. 1366, 1366 (1980).
NLRB v. Lighthouse for the Blind of Houston, 696 F.2d at 407. See supra
55 and accompanying text for an explanation of "employee" under the NLRA.
Id. at 404-06. See infra note 155 and accompanying text for a discussion of this

standard.
150.

Id. See infra note 153 and accompanying text for a discussion of this standard.
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organizations with predominately business or economic characteris
tiCS. ISI The court determined that working at workshop "A" was con
tingent upon certain typical business criteria. The court stated that
employees were working under "commercial and business conditions."
The decision was based on the fact that employees were compensated
at or above minimum wage, received merit raises, were disciplined for
low productivity, punched a clock, had production deadlines, and
worked a forty-hour week. Also, employees, in many instances, were
permanently . employed, and the workshop was
not supported by addi
.
tional outside funds, but ran the facilities for .the most part on profits
from the workshops. Because the court determined that these charac
teristics were typical of working conditions and work environments
normally subject to collective bargaining, the court ruled that the
workshop should fall under the jurisdiction of the National Labor Re
lations Board. ls2 The court concluded that the Lighthouse for the
Blind of Houston should follow Cincinnati Association for the Blind v..
NLRB IS3 due to the similarities in operational, productivity, compen
sation, and marketing factors between the two cases. IS4 The Cincin
nati court developed an "economic" pattern in which business
characteristics predominate rather than the "therapeutic" pattern of
Goodwill Industries of Southern California. ISS The court recognized
151. !d. at 404.
152. Id. at 405-06.
153. 672 F.2d 567 (6th Cir. 1982). Cincinnati Association is a nonprofit corporation
dedicated to the interests of the visually impaired. It offers training, counseling, and social
services to all blind members of the community. Id. at 569. The workshop, employing
. seventy blind and four sighted individuals, made $144,000.00 in profits that it used to de
fray unrelated expenses. Id. Blind individuals are paid on a piece work basis while sighted
individuals receive an hourly wage. Id. All employees work a forty-hour week, receive
paid holidays, and paid vacation time, worker's compensation and life insurance, and are
disciplined for serious misconduct. Id. at 570. The court determined that the program
contemplated long term employment with very few leaving into the competitive market.
Id.
The Board and the court were faced with deciding whether handicapped workers in
sheltered workshops are "employees" under the NLRA. The court discussed the fact that
sheltered workshop workers were not, as a matter of law, excluded from the NLRA. The
court was faced with deciding whether the Board had adequate facts characterizing shel
tered workshop employees as "employees" under the NLRA. Id. at 572. The court upheld
the decision of the Board, deferring to the Board's discretion in determining the employees'
status. Id. at 572-73. However, the court agreed with the Board that the case strongly
suggested that the " 'rehabilitative' and 'therapeutic' nexus is ... subordinate to routine
business considerations." Id. at 571. The Board concluded that the similarities between
clients and private workers outweighed the differences and that economic motives prevailed
despite the professed therapeutic orientation. Id. at 572-73. The Board stated that, overall,
the workshop was based on economic considerations. Id. at 573.
·154. NLRB v. Lighthouse for the Blind of Houston, 696 F.2d at 406.
155. 231 N.L.R.B. 536 (1977). Goodwill is a nonprofit, charitable organization pro
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the Board's broad discretion in determining the status of individuals
under the NLRA and the well established limited review of such deci
sions by the court.156 The court found no error in the Board's deter
mination. The court also noted that there was no congressional policy
establishing that collective bargaining is totally inconsistent with a re
habilitative activity. 157
C.

Key Opportunities, Inc. 158

Key Opportunities operates a sheltered workshop employing sev
enty to eighty mentally, emotionally, socially, or physically handi
capped "clients." Key Opportunities' "work activities" program
serves about thirty clients who, due to their handicaps, would in all
probability always need a sheltered workshop. Clients receive wages
which vary according to production, punch a time clock, work regular
hours, receive paid holidays and vacations, and are disciplined for mis
behavior. Key Opportunities does not make a profit. 159
The Board refused to assert jurisdiction over the clients at Key
viding rehabilitative work experience to individuals whose handicaps make them ineligible
for ~ork in the private competitive job market. Id. Ninety-five percent of Goodwill's in
come is generated through sales in its stores of items discarded and restored by its "employ
ees." Id. The other five percent of its income is gained through monetary contributions.
Id. Of the 750 people employed by Goodwill, 100 are staff and supervisory employees, 80
to 100 are client trainees referred from a state agency on a fee basis, and 650 to 670 are
handicapped persons, referred to as "clients." Id. Clients are allowed to work at their own
pace, and they receive the same hourly wage, life insurance, and paid vacations. Id. at 537.
Clients are disciplined on an interview basis, and disciplinary discharges are rare. Id.
Goodwill furnishes clients with rehabilitation, social services, vocational, medical, and legal
counseling as well as employing a job placement specialist for finding jobs for clients in
private industry. Id. Half of the client positions are reserved for extended employment
while the other half are designated for transitional employment. Id.
The Board was confronted with deciding whether the Goodwill employees were "em
ployees" under the NLRA, and thus, within the Board's jurisdiction. The Board deter
mined that Goodwill's concern is for rehabilitating its clients and not for producing a
product for profit. Id. The Board considered the facts that the clients are hired regardless
of the severity of their impairment and are paid the same wage regardless of their produc
tivity level, as an instrument of the rehabilitative process. Id. Goodwill is considered to be
one of the rare instances where an employer's concern for his employees competes with and
displaces the union's normal objectives. Id. It was determined that to allow collective
bargaining in such a setting would risk a harmful intrusion on the rehabilitative process.
Id. The Board held that to assert jurisdiction in this case would not only be likely to distort
the unique employee-employer relationship and impair the employer's ability to accomplish
its salutary objectives, but it would not effectuate the purposes of the National Labor Rela
tions Act. Id. at 538. The Board dismissed the union's petition upon deciding that these
employees were not "employees" under the NLRA. Id.
156. NLRB v. Lighthouse for the Blind of Houston, 696 F.2d at 404.
157. Id. at 407.
158. 265 N.L.R.B. 1371 (1982).
159. Id. at 1373.
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Opportunities due to its determination that the clients were not "em
ployees" within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act.
The Board determined that Key Opportunities did not employ indi
viduals expecting to benefit from their output, but that their sole pur
pose was to provide work rehabilitation and work-based therapy for
handicapped individuals. The organization intended only to provid~
jobs as a form of therapy, and thus, their only hiring criterion was
whether the client would benefit. The Board justified its decision by
stating that the "exploitation" which the National Labor Relations
Act attempts to regulate only exists where a person employs another
person to derive some net benefit from the other's output. l60
This overriding therapeutic purpose distinguishes "employees"
from "clients." This analytical approach has been determinative in
other situations involving sh~ltered workshops employing handi
capped individuals.
IV.

ARKANSAS LIGHTHOUSE FOR THE BLIND v. NLRBI61
HISTORY AND ANALYSIS

The Arkansas Lighthouse for the Blind was brought before the
Board in 1987 for engaging in unfair labor practices as q.escribed in the
National Labor Relations Act. Arkansas Lighthouse was accused of
violating provisions of the NLRA by, among other things, threatening
employees with plant closings and/or loss of work, promising in
creased compensation to discourage union support, refusing to bargain
with the union, soliciting revocations of union authorization cards,
and interrogating employees. 162 The Arkansas Lighthouse claimed
that their handicapped workers did not fall within the definition of
"employee" as covered by the NLRA.163 The Board dismissed the
Lighthouse's argument and determined that the Lighthouse workers
are "employees" within the NLRA.I64 The Board looked to a deter
mination of an industrial versus a rehabilitative purpose of the organi
zation in deciding that it was not rehabilitative in nature and, thus,
within the jurisdiction of the Board. 165 Arkansas Lighthouse appealed
this decision to the court of appeals for review of the Board's
determination.
Arkansas Lighthouse for the Blind is a nonprofit, charitable cor
160. Id. at 1374.
161. 851 F.2d 180 (8th Cir. 1988).
162. Arkansas Lighthouse for the Blind, 284 N.L.R.B. No. 110 (1987).
163.
164.
165.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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poration which is engaged in manufacturing products under a shel
tered workshop certificate issued by the Department of Labor under
section 14(c)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act. 166 Eighty-four per
cent of the Lighthouse's employees are blind. Although the Light
house may pay its workers'fifty percent of minimum wage under the
sheltered workshop certificate, all of the employees are paid identical
hourly wages above minimum wage, regardless of productivity and
length of service and receive yearly increases. Employees are disci
plined for serious misconduct and may be discharged for severe of
fenses. However, employees do have a grievance procedure as
established by the employee manual. 167 Employees work a full work
week, punch a time clock, and receive overtime compensation, insur
ance benefits, unemployment benefits, worker's compensation, and
paid holidays and vacation time. 168 The Lighthouse does not provide
social and counseling services or a recreational area for its employees.
or the blind community as a whole, but merely complies with the De"
partment of Labor requirements for placement and counseling by,
sending an annual list of clients capable of competitive employment tp
the Office of the Blind and Visually Impaired. 169
The employees, referred by the state Office of the Blind and Visu
ally Impaired (about 98%), undergo a thirty-day training period after
which they are retained if minimum production requirements are sat
isfied. Clients not producing sufficiently may be involuntarily trans
ferred to another department or not recalled from a layoff. However,
clients are never forced to leave, even if capable of working elsewhere.
On occasion, the Lighthouse has removed sighted employees to mak,e,
jobs available to clients, and at one point, a job position was subd~~.
vided into two in order to make room for a client. 170 Actual produc
tion ranges from under fifty to about eighty percent that of a sighted
employee with about thirty-five to forty percent of the workers pro
ducing close to eighty percent; fifty percent produce at about fifty to
sixty percent; and ten to fifteen percent produce at a lower rate. 171
The ultimate goal of the Lighthouse is to place its employees in
private industry. In prior years, the actual number of placements has
166,
See supra
Act.
167.
168.
169.
170.

171.

Arkansas Lighthouse for the Blind v. NLRB, 851 F.2d 180, 181 (8th Cir, 1988).
notes 76-105 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Fair Labor Standards
Id. at 181.
Id. at 182.
Id. at 183-84.
Id. at 183.
Arkansas Lighthouse for the Blind, 284 N.L.R.B. No. 110 (1987).
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ranged from five to eight per year. The Lighthouse sells over ninety
percent of its products to the government under contracts pursuant to
the Wagner-O'Day Act. l72 Although annual sales exceeded
$500,000.00 with over $50,000.00 of that being shipped to points
outside of the state, the Lighthouse does not make a profit. 173
The court stated that the National Labor Relations Board took a
much too restrictive view of what constitutes "rehabilitation" or
"therapy."174 The court held that the Board abused its discretion and
declared that the Lighthouse's employees were not employees within
the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, thereby denying the
Board jurisdiction over these workers.175
The court explained that although the Act defines the word "em
ployee" very broadly, the Board has subdivided the term into two dis
tinct groups. The first group is considered to be "rehabilitative" or
"therapeutic," and the second is "primarily industrial."176 Although
the Lighthouse operations resemble that of private industry, this is as
much an instrument of the rehabilitative process as any other aspect.
Especially determinative was the fact that all employees are paid an
equal wage regardless of productivity. The court stated that wages
related to productivity and tenure are usually a "hallmark" of private
employment. The fact that the workshop environment resembles that
of private employment was a useful rehabilitative and therapeutic de
vice, .used to prepare the "clients" for private employment. 177 The
Lighthouse has a production goal of eighty percent of the production
of a sighted employee; however, only about sixty to sixty-five percent
of its employees ever. produce above the sixty percent level. 178
Although it was determined that an in-house counselor would aid the
overall placement effort, it was not per se insufficient to simply comply
with Department of Labor requirements.
Further, in the past, the private sector has not been anxious to
hire blind workers. 179 Before inferring an industrial motive upon such
a basis, the handicaps involved should be considered. ISO The Board's
172. Arkansas Lighthouse for the Blind v. NLRB, 851 F.2d 180, 181 (8th Cir. 1988).
See infra notes 59-75 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Wagner-O'Day Act.
173. Id. at 182-83.
174. Id. at 182.
175. Id. at 185.
176. Id. at 182. See supra notes 148-53 and accompanying text for further discussion
of these standards.
177. Id. at 183-84.
178. Id. at 183 n.3.
179. Id. at 184.
180. Id. at 185.
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action and view would tend to discourage the formation and operation
of non-profit projects to aid and assist therapeutic and rehabilitative
efforts and the employment of the handicapped as promoted by the
Wagner-O'Day Act. ISI
Furthermore, due. to the nature of the workshop, the normal
objectives of a labor union, although emphasized in a different man
ner, are overtaken by the employer itself. If a union were established
and demanded higher wages and/or better benefits, the employer
might be forced to reduce the number of handicapped individuals it
employs, employ more productive workers, or change employment
policies in order to waylay harmful union demands. ls2 The ultimate
goal of the workshop was to help the employees obtain skills and a
sense of self-worth rather than financial gain. IS3 The court acknowl
edged the fact that the other court of appeals' cases analyzing this
issue agree with the Board's decision, thus creating a split in interpre
tation by the federal court system. IS4
The Arkansas Lighthouse court acknowledged other policies and
legislation, such as the Wagner-O'Day Act, involving handicapped
employees in sheltered workshops. Prior to the Arkansas Lighthouse
decision, courts, such as the Houston Lighthouse court, neglected to
address the legislative and policy issues relevant to these individuals.
V.

ANALYSIS OF ARKANSAS LIGHTHOUSE FOR THE BLIND

DECISION CONSIDERING POLICY AND PRIOR DECISIONS

The NLRA defines the terms used in the Act very broadly. ISS
Although the Board has been given broad discretion in interpreting
these terms, the Board must still exercise this discretion within the
constraints and limitations prescribed by Congress. IS6 The NLRA
does not specifically exclude handicapped employees in sheltered
181. [d. at 183. See supra notes 59-75 and accompanying text for a further discus~
sion of the Wagner-O'Day Act.
182. [d. at 183.
183. Id. at 185.
184. Id. at 184.
185. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944). "[T]he broad lan
guage of the Act's definitions ... [of] 'employee,' 'employer,' and 'labor dispute,' leaves no
doubt that its applicability is to be determined broadly ...." [d. at 129-30. See supra notes
4-7 and ~ccompanying text for a further discussion of the definitions and their. interpreta
tion under the NLRA.
186. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1947). "It is inconceivable that
Congress, when it passed the act, authorized the Board to give every word in the act
whatever meaning it wished .... Congress intended ... that the Board give to the words
not far-fetched meanings but ordinary meanings." Id. See supra notes 4-8 and accompany
.'
ing text for a further discussion of the Board's discretion.
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workshops from the Board's jurisdiction, but does exclude other speci
fied groups. 187 Congress previously expressed its intention to give the
Board the full breadth of congressional power under the commerce
clause. 188 Accordingly, courts also entrusted the Board with broad
powers when interpreting and enforcing the Act. 189 In the Amend
ments of 1947, Congress expressed the view that nonprofit charitable
organizations, in general, would not fall within the Board's jurisdic
tion because they did not affect commerce, but Congress did not spe
cifically deny the Board's jurisdiction over such organizations. 19o If
Congress intended to bar completely the Board from exercising juris
diction in such situations, it would have amended the statute to indi
cate that intention, as it did in other specific instances. 191 Congress'
failure to amend the statute in this manner has left the Board to decide
in which cases to exercise jurisdiction over nonprofit organizations.
As discussed in the Catholic Bishops decision,192 the Board's standards
may not constitute a workable guide for exercise of its jurisdiction. 193
The Board has never outlined clear guidelines or standards to explain
187. 29 U.S.c. § 152(3) (1982). See supra notes 4-5 & 55-56 and accompanying text
for a further discussion of the definitions of "employee" and "employer" under the NLRA.
188. H.R. REP. No. 969, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1935). "In enacting the National
Labor Relations Act, Congress gave and intended to give the Board the fullest possible
jurisdiction under the commerce clause of the Constitution." NLRB v. Erlich's 814, Inc.,
577 F.2d 68, 70 (8th Cir. 1978). See also NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224
(1963); Polish Nat'\. Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643 (1944). See supra note 26 and ac
companying text for a further discussion of Congress' power under the commerce clause.
189. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). Congress' power under the com
merce clause is "broad and sweeping; where it keeps within its sphere and violates no ex
press constitutional limitation it has been the rule of this Court ... not to interfere." Id. at
305. This power may be exerted to prevent the disruption of commerce. Id. See supra note
26 ahd accompanying text for a further discussion of Congress' power under the commerce
clause.
190. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 32, reprinted in 1947 U.S.
CODE. CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 1135, 1137. "The other nonprofit organizations ... are
not specifically excluded in the conference agreement, for only in exceptional circumstances
and in connection with purely commercial activities ... [have they] been considered as
affecting commerce so as to bring them within the scope of the National Labor Relations
Act." Id. ,See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text for a further discussion of organi
zati~ns exempt from the NLRA.
191. 29 U.S.C. § 183 (1982). See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text for a
discussion Of th~ health care industry provisions 'in the NLRA.
192. 440 U.S. 490 (1979). See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text for a further
discussion of the Catholic Bishops decision.
193. NLRB V. Catholic Bishops of Chicago, 440 U.S. at 490. The Board's standard
to establish its jurisdiction over religious schools entailed a determinatio'n of whether the
school is'''completely religious" and not "merely religiously associated." Id. at 495. This
standard "failed to provide a workable guide for the exercise of discretion." Id. See supra
notes 42-43 and accompanying text for a further discussion of the Catholic Bishops
decision.
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the "typically industrial" or "rehabilitative" categories concerning
sheltered workshops.194 The Arkansas Lighthouse 195 court did not
deny the fact that the Board may, in certain circumstances, have juris
diction over these types of employees; however, it questioned the
Board's application of these broad guidelines in light of other legisla
tive policies involving handicapped individuals. 196 The Arkansas
Lighthouse court indicated that in the present case the Board took a
much too restrictive view of "rehabilitative" workshops, thereby abus
ing its discretion. 197
The Arkansas Lighthouse court was concerned that the Board's
exercise of jurisdiction in these situations tended to discourage the for
mation and operation of sheltered workshops, undermining congres
sional intention to protect and further the interests of the
handicapped. 198 Unionization may force such organizations to change
their operations significantly enough to defeat the purposes of these
organizations and the congressional policies to provide and encourage
employment for handicapped individuals. 199
The legislation pertaining to handicapped individuals indicates
some underlying policies which cannot be ignored. Congress enacted
this legislation to encourage the hiring and retention of such individu
194. See supra notes 148-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of these
standards.
195. Arkansas Lighthouse for the Blind v. NLRB, 851 F.2d 180 (8th Cir. 1988).
196. See supra notes 59-136 and accompanying text for a discussion of other legisla
tion involving handicapped individuals.
197. Arkansas Lighthouse for the Blind v. NLRB, 851 F.2d at 182. "[T]he Board
has taken a much too restrictive view of what constitutes rehabilitation or therapy." Id.
"[T]he Board's exercise of jurisdiction resulted from an erroneous view of what constitutes
rehabilitation." Id. at 183. See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text for a further
discussion of the Arkansas Lighthouse court's determination.
198. Arkansas Lighthouse for the Blind v. NLRB, 851 F.2d at 183. "The Board's
action and view of its majority adopts the opposite view of discouraging formation and
operation of non-profit projects to aid and assist therapeutic and rehabilitative efforts to
employ the handicapped." Id. See supra note 180 and accompanying text. See supra notes
58-135 and accompanying text for a discussion of legislation enacted to address the
problems and concerns of handicapped individuals.
199. Arkansas Lighthouse for the Blind v. NLRB, 851 F.2d at 183. The court in
discussing the Wagner-O'Day Act determined that "[t]he Board's action [of allowing
unionization] and view of its majority adopts the opposite view of discouraging the forma
tion and operation of non-profit projects to aid and assist therapeutic and rehabilitative
efforts to employ the handicapped." Id. at 183. The court also acknowledged that "to
permit collective bargaining in this context is to risk harmful intrusion on the rehabilitative
process ... [and] is likely to distort the unique relationship between Employer and client
and impair the Employer's ability to accomplish its salutory objectives." Id. (quoting
Goodwill Industries of Southern California, 231 N.L.R.B. 536, 537-38 (1977». See supra
notes 155, 180, & 181 and accompanying text for a discussion of unionization in the envi
ronment of a sheltered workshop.
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als in an employment setting. 2°O This legislation has resulted in con
certed efforts to focus attention on the problems and needs of the
handicapped and to vitalize the commitment of the United States to
overcome these problems. 20\ Programs and policies instituted through
the Wagner-O'Day Act,202 the Fair Labor Standards Act,203 the Reha
bilitative Act of 1973,204 and the Internal Revenue Code205 provide a
basis for understanding congressional intent with respect to these indi
viduals. Although handicapped individuals should be treated as pro
200. H.R. REP. No. 228, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 21, reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 1079, 1093. The Wagner-O'Day Act is consistent with "the De
partment [of Laborl's objective to promote employment of the handicapped." Id. Con
gress hoped that the handicapped would "acquire sufficient job-skill proficiency to enter a
competitive job situation." Id. The Fair Labor Standards Act allows for the operation of
the sheltered workshop which is defined as a "charitable organization or institution con
ducted not for profit, but for the purpose of carrying out a recognized program of rehabili
tation ... or other occupational rehabilitating activity of an educational or therapeutic
nature" for handicapped workers. 29 C.F.R. § 525.2(b) (1988). The Rehabilitation Act of
1973 was designed, in part, "to focus research and training activities on making employ
ment and participation in society more feasible for handicapped individuals." S. REP. No.
318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 19, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 2076,
2092. See supra notes 58-135 and accompanying text for a further discussion of legislation
pertaining to handicapped individuals.
201. S. REP. No. 1330, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1938). In enacting the Wagner
O'Day Act, Congress recognized that the employment opportunities for the blind are lim
ited, and; therefore, "the Government should spare no effort to aid and assist them by
means other than relief grant." Id. The Fair Labor Standards Act was amended in 1966
for the "purpose of improving the economic circumstances of handicapped workers, speed
ing their movement into fully protective private employment, and assuring that such work
ers are not exploited through low wages." S. REP. No. 1487, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 23,
reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 3002, 3025. The Act was further
amended to provide handicapped individuals with the "due process protection [that] is an
essential element in the [Act] ... and will hopefully insure against exploitation of this
vulnerable sector of our work force." 132 CONGo REC. H8825 (daily ed. Oct. I, 1986)
(statements of Rep. Murphy). The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 sought to "improve in every
possible respect the lives as well as the livelihood of [handicapped] individuals served." S.
REP. No. 318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN.
NEWS 2076, 2079. The Act is intended to promote a "better program of service" and
"designed to focus research and training activities on making employment and participa
tion in society more feasible for handicapped individuals." Id. at 19, reprinted in 1973 U.S.
CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 2092. See supra notes 62-63,91-96, 107, & 114-18 and
accompanying text for a further discussion of Congress' commitment to handicapped
individuals.
202. 41 U.S.C. §§ 46-48 (1982). See supra notes 59-75 and accompanying text for a
further discussion of the Wagner-O'Day Act.
203. 29 U.S.c. §§ 201-219 (1982). See supra notes 76-105 and accompanying text
for a further discussion of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
204. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1982). See supra notes 106-24 and accompanying text
for Ii further discussion of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
205. 26 U.S.C. §§ 1-9501 (1982). See supra notes 125-35 and accompanying text for
a further discussion of the Internal Revenue Code.
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ductive and worthwhile citizens, employers must be aware of limited
capabilities due to their handicap(s). These congressional policies and
intentions must be considered in situations involving the handicapped.
Although it wished to encourage the handicapped to seek em
ployment in private industry, Congress realized that this goal may not
always be obtainable-depending on both the handicap and the indi
vidual.206 Balancing the actual limitations of the handicapped against
hopes of rehabilitation invokes the realization that the relationship be
tween these individuals and present and potential employers must be
dealt with carefully. In realizing the need to encourage employers to
hire the handicapped, Congress requires the governqtent to purchase
products made by the handicapped,207 gives such nonprofit charitable
organizations hiring the handicapped tax exempt status,208 allows.em
ployers of the handicapped to pay wages below minimum wage upon
approval by the Secretary of Labor,209 and requires state and federal
programs to address and oversee matters involving the handicapped,
including provisions trying to eliminate discrimination against the
handicapped. 210 Through this type of legislation, Congress encour
ages employment of the handicapped while also trying to curb abuse of
flexibilities and incentives given to employers employing such individ
uals. 211 Legislation has developed in response to these concerns. Con
206. S. REP. No. 318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 19, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONGo &
ADMIN. NEWS 2076, 2092. Congress wishes for the programs in the Rehabilitation Act to
"remain vocationally oriented, it does believe that there are handicapped individuals whose
handicaps are so severe, or because of other circumstances, such as age, that they may
never achieve employment." Id. Congress strived to find methods so that "such individu
als may gain entrance to the vocational rehabilitation program or may be enabled to live
more independently." Id. at 2093. The Wagner-O'Day Act was expanded to "promote
employment of the handicapped. Hopefully it will assist some of the severely handicapped
to acquire sufficient job-skill proficiency to enter a competitive job situation." H.R. REP.
No. 228, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 21, reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS
1079, 1093. See supra notes 64-66 & 114-18 and accompanying text for a further discussion
of congressional policy.
207. 41 U.S.c. §§ 46-48 (1982). See supra notes 59-75 and accompanying text.
208. 26 U.S.c. § 501 (1982). See supra notes 125-35 and accompanying text.
209. 29 U.S.c. §§ 201-19 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See supra notes 76-105 and ac
companying text.
210. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1982). See supra notes 106-24 and accompanying text.
211. S. REP. No. 145, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 46, reprinted in 1961 U.S. CODE CONGo
& ADMIN. NEWS 1620, 1665. Congress observed that "subminimum rates ... while com
mendably flexible, also obviously permit ready abuse at the expense of the handicapped
workers ...." Id. Representative Murphy indicated that, since Congress was "granting
employers greater flexibility to manage their handicapped enterprises, it is absolutely essen
tial that [Congress] preserve protections of the handicapped workers ...." 132 CONGo
REC. H8825 (daily ed. Oct. I, 1986) (statements of Rep. Murphy). Congress wished to
"ensure against exploitation of this vulnerable sector of our work force." Id. See supra
notes 86-96 and accompanying text.
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gress has set up committees to investigate the social and economic
situations confronting the handicapped,212 encouraged providing
fringe benefits to these employees,213 allowed subminimum wages to be
paid upon approval of the Secretary of Labor, and provided employees
with a means to petition the Secretary of Labor for wage reviews. 214
The Arkansas Lighthouse court and Congress recognize that employ
ers in private industry may not always be willing or able to hire the
handicapped and that placement records from sheltered workshops
may not be an accurate measure of the rehabilitative process. 2lS
Unlike the Arkansas Lighthouse court, the Houston Lighthouse
court did not address the relevant policy and legislation considerations
that concern handicapped individuals. The Houston Lighthouse court
based its decision solely on whether the Board abused its discretion
under the NLRA as indicated from inferences drawn from the factual
situation. 216 Despite the factual similarities between the Houston
Lighthouse and the Arkansas Lighthouse, the two courts came to con
flicting decisions concerning the discretion of the Board to assert juris
diction over these employees. 217 While the Houston Lighthouse court
found, that the operations of the Lighthouse too closely paralleled
212. 41 U.S.C. § 47(e) (1982). Congress created a committee to conduct "continuing
study and evaluation of its activities ... for the purpose of assuming effective and efficient
administration of [the Wagner-O'Day Act)." Id. See supra notes 68-72 & 119-221 and
accompanying text.
213. H.R. REP. No. 228, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE CONGo
& ADMIN. NEWS 1079, 1085. The House of Representatives indicated that there was "an
other area of Congressional concern, namely the need to explore the relationship of the
handicapped workers and their workshops to fringe benefits." Id. The House of Repre
sentatives suggested that "studies of policies and practices of workshops with respect to
[fringe benefits] should be undertaken." Id. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
214. 29 U.S.c. § 214(c) (Supp. IV 1986). See supra notes 97-105 and accompanying
text.
215. Arkansas Lighthouse for the Blind v. NLRB, 851 F.2d 180, 184 (8th Cir. 1988).
"Lighthouse's rehabilitative object is not undermined by its unspectacular placement rate.
Experience indicates that the private sector is not very anxious to hire blind workers." Id.
"[T]here are handicapped individuals whose handicaps are so severe, or because of other
circumstances, such as age, that may never achieve employment." S. REP. No. 318, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 19, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 2076,2092. See
. supra notes 117 & 178 and accompanying text.
216. NLRB V. Lighthouse for the Blind of Houston, 696 F.2d 399, 406-07 (5th Cir.
1983). "We can find no error in the Board's determination ...." Id. "The Board has
determined that application of the Act to workers in workshops such as the Lighthouse ...
is entirely consistent with the statutory purpose. We find that such a determination has a
'reasonable basis in law.''' Id. at 407 (quoting NLRB V. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322
U.S. Ill, 131). See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
217. NLRB V. Lighthouse for the Blind of Houston, 696 F.2d at 404; Arkansas
Lighthouse for the Blind v. NLRB, 851 F.2d at 182. See supra notes 156 & 175 and accom
panying text for a further discussion of the courts' decisions.
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those found in private industry,218 the Arkansas Lighthouse court
found these parallels to be good preparation for employment in private
industry and useful in acclimating handicapped employees to private
industry.219 The Arkansas Lighthouse court indicated that this type
of environment is probably the most successful method of
rehabilitation.220
The Houston Lighthouse court did not address the policies and
legislation relevant to sheltered workshops and handicapped employ
ees, but simply deferred to the Board's discretion. 221 It ignored the
unique situation of these individuals and the economic realities of
workshops and their clients in the realm of private industry and em
ployers. Although this decision is consistent with the Board's discre
tion, it failed to address the relevant underlying issues,222 which
include government purchases required by the Wagner-O'Day Act,
wage provisions instated by the Fair Labor Standards Act, policies
and programs underlying the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the tax
exempt status of sheltered workshops provided by the Internal Reve
nue Code.
The Board seems to use inconsistent criteria in determining
whether a specific sheltered workshop is within its jurisdiction. When
the Board chooses not to assert jurisdiction, it focuses on its own view
of the employer's objectives. 223 In decisions where jurisdiction is as
218. NLRB v. Lighthouse for the Blind of Houston, 696 F.2d at 405-06. "These
working conditions and this working environment are in dominant measure typical of
working conditions and a working environment subject to collective bargaining. . . . The
panoply of working conditions and benefits which the Lighthouse has paternalistically
given to Workshop A are the normal and usual grist for the mill of collective bargaining."
Id. at 406. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
219. Id. at 183. "There may be no better preparation for work in private industry
than time spent in a caring environment which in some respects parallels private industry."
Id. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
220. Arkansas Lighthouse for the Blind v. NLRB, 851 F.2d at 183. "Work is proba
bly the most productive and successful method of rehabilitation for handicapped persons
who are able to work, and particularly the blind." Id.
221. NLRB v. Lighthouse for the Blind of Houston, 696 F.2d at 404. See supra note
156 and accompanying text.
222. NLRB v. Lighthouse for the Blind of Houston, 696 F.2d at 407. The court
determined that the Board's application of the NLRA to such employees "is entirely con
sistent with the statutory purpose." Id. The court found that "such a determination has a
'reasonable basis in law.''' Id. Further, the court stated that "[t]here is no Congressional
policy that collective bargaining is totally inconsistent with rehabilitative activity." Id. See
supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text for a further discussion of the Houston Light
house court's reasoning.
223. See Key Opportunities, Inc., 265 N.L.R.B. 1371 (1982) (the Board found that
Key did not employ individuals expecting to benefit from their output). See also Goodwill
Industries of Southern California, 231 N.L.R.B. 536 (1977) (the Board determined that

1989]

HANDICAPPED EMPLOYEES

385

serted, the Board has made sweeping conclusions concerning the un
derlying economic motives of the employer. 224 Consistency and
predictability are lacking in these decisions, thereby failing to provide
any substantial basis for future determinations.
In determining whether handicapped employees in sheltered
workshops come under the NLRA, the Board has exercised its discre
tion in deciding if the Board has jurisdiction in a particular case. The
courts have, for the most part, deferred to the Board's discretion, rec
ognizing the broad definitions used in dictating jurisdiction under the
NLRA.22S The Arkansas court expressed the need to go beyond the
actual language of the NLRA and to consider other policies and con
cerns involving handicapped employees in sheltered workshops.226
The Arkansas court realized the problems in applying the "rehabilita
tive" or "typically industrial" distinction applied by the Board to
handicapped employees in sheltered workshops.227 Although the Ar
kansas court addressed the issue, the language and legislative history
of the NLRA precludes courts from determining that the Board may
not exercise jurisdiction in these environments. 228
In examining the policy and history behind the NLRA, Congress
created exemptions and special provisions in order to regulate the indi
viduals that are within the exercise of the Board's jurisdictional power
Goodwill's concern was for rehabilitating its clients and not for producing a product for
profit). See supra notes 155 & 158-60 and accompanying text for a further discussion of
these decisions.
224. See Cincinnati Assoc. for the Blind v. NLRB, 672 F.2d 567 (6th Cir. 1982) (the
court determined that economic motives prevailed despite the therapeutic orientation). See
also The Chicago Lighthouse for the Blind, 225 N.L.R.B. 249 (1976) (the Board deter
mined this employer, engaged in non-retail performance of services, derived a substantial
part of money from private subcontracts, and, thus, it effectuated the policies of the Act to
assert jurisdiction). See supra notes 136-42 & 153 for a further discussion of these
decisions.
225. Cincinnati Assoc. for the Blind v. NLRB, 672 F.2d 567 (6th Cir. 1982). The
Cincinnati court indicated that the "Board['s] discretion ... is subject to limited judicial
review." Id. at 572. The court "decline[d] to disturb this exercise of the Board's discre
tion." Id. at 573.
The Houston Lighthouse court found "no error in the Board's determination." NLRB
v. Lighthouse for the Blind of Houston, 696 F.2d 399, 407 (5th Cir. 1983). The court
further found that "such a determination has a 'reasonable basis in law.''' Id. See supra
notes 153, 156-57, & 215 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text for a further discussion of the
Arkansas Lighthouse court's reasoning.
227. See supra notes 174-79 and accompanying text for a further discussion of the
Arkansas Lighthouse court's reasoning.
228. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982). See supra notes 16-56 and accompanying text for
a further discussion of the NLRA, the Board's jurisdictional power, and the exemptions
from the Board's jurisdiction.

386

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11:347

and the extent to which that jurisdiction may be exercised. 229 The
Arkansas Lighthouse court correctly examined other factors, external
to the NLRA, in determining that there isa strong public policy to
encourage and protect employment of handicapped individuals in
sheltered workshops.230 The court recognized the potential problems
which may result from unregulated and uncontrolled unionization of
handicapped employees in sheltered workshops.231 One of the pur
poses behind the extensive legislation involving the handicapped is to
encourage employment opportunities for handicapped individuals. 232
This purpose is furthered by offering incentives to potential employers
to encourage the formation and operation of sheltered workshops em
229. 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1982). See also 29 U.S.C. § 183 (1982). See supra notes 4-8,
42-43 & 46-56 and accompanying text for a further discussion of the individuals within the
Board's jurisdictional power.
230. Arkansas Lighthouse for the Blind v. NLRB, 851 F.2d at 183. The court stated
that:
Our society through its government recognizes ... [work as a successful method
of rehabilitation] by aiding and assisting with the Wagner-O'Day Act .... The
Wagner-O'Day Act assists projects aiding the handicapped by providing a ready
market and purchase of the productive efforts engendered by the not-for-profit
groups seeking to employ handicapped people. The Board's action and view of its
majority adopts the opposite view of discouraging the formation and operation of
non-profit projects to aid and assist therapeutic and rehabilitative efforts to em
ploy the handicapped.
Id. See supra notes 180 & 198 and accompanying text.
231. Arkansas Lighthouse for the Blind v. NLRB, 851 F.2d at 183. "The usual
employer-employee relationship in our competitive marketplace is not present in these good
faith efforts to employ the handicapped nor is the Union's normal objective of securing
improved working conditions for the employees either necessary or productive of that ob
jective." Id. "'To permit collective bargaining in this context is to risk harmful intrusion
on the rehabilitative process. . .. The collective bargaining process ... is likely to distort
the unique relationship between Employer and client and impair the Employer's ability to
accomplish its salutory objectives.''' Id. (quoting Goodwill Industries of Southern Cali
fornia, 231 N.L.R.B. 536, 537-38 (1977». See supra notes 155, 181, & 198 and accompany
ing text.
232. S. REP. No. 1330, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1938). Because limited employment
opportunities are available to the blind, the Wagner-O'Day Act provided that "the Govern
ment should spare no effort to aid and assist [the blind] by means other than relief grant."
Id. The Fair Labor Standards Act has been amended for the purpose of "improving the
economic circumstances of handicapped workers, speeding their movement into fully pro
tective private employment, and assuring that such workers are not exploited through low
wages." S. REP. No. 1487, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONGo &
ADMIN. NEWS 3002, 3025. One of the purposes of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is to
"focus research and training activities on making employment and participation in society
more feasible for handicapped individuals." S. REP. No. 318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 19,
reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 2076, 2092. See supra notes 62-63,
91-96, 107, 114-18 & 200 and accompanying text for a further discussion of Congress'
commitment to handicapped individuals.
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ploying handicapped individuals. 233
Although the Board does have the power to assert jurisdiction
over handicapped employees in sheltered workshops,234 it may not be
desirable to allow the unionization that may result. In accordance
with the specific legislation and policies involved, handicapped indi
viduals and their interests must be understood and represented suffi
ciently in the bargaining process between the employer and the
representative union. To allow unregulated negotiations between par
ties with little understanding of the special place in society of the
handicapped could be devastating for the parties involved. Handi
capped individuals employed in sheltered workshops and sheltered
workshops employing the handicapped as well as the handicapped
population in general could be adversely affected. There is a strong
public policy, indicated by legislation, to regulate and control the em
ployment relationship.235 Although public interest demands that
handicapped employees not be deprived of their statutory rights, it is
necessary for parties involved to understand the special problems in
volved and to mitigate the possible effects.236 The uniqueness of shel
tered workshops along with the specific issues involving the
handicapped dictates the need to have some regulation and control
233. H.R. REP. No. 228, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 21, reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 1079, 1092-93. The Wagner-O'Day Act requires the government
to purchase certain commodities from sheltered workshops in order to "promote employ
ment of the handicapped." Id. Congress hoped that these measures would "assist some of
the severely handicapped to acquire sufficient job-skill proficiency to enter a competitive job
situation." [d. The Fair Labor Standards Act allows employers of handicapped employees
to pay those employees a wage rate below minimum wage. 29 U.S.c. § 214(c)(I)(a) (1982
& Supp. IV 1986). The Internal Revenue Code also provides tax exempt status for shel
tered workshops. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (1982). See supra notes 64-66,97-105,114-18,126
29, & 205 for a further discussion of the expression of congressional intent to encourage the
hiring of handicapped individuals.
234. 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1982). See supra notes 16-57 and accompanying text for a
further discussion of the Board's jurisdiction over handicapped employees under the
NLRA.
235. 132 CONGo REC. H8825-8826 (daily ed. Oct. I, 1986) (statements of Rep. Petri).
Representative Petri observed that the special provisions in the Fair Labor Standards Act
"allow employment opportunities for handicapped persons who would not be able to com
pete for jobs in the regular labor marketplace if the regular minimum wage had to be paid."
[d. See supra notes 91-96,99-104, & 117-19 and accompanying text.
236. 41 U.S.c. § 47 (1982). "The Committee [for Purchase from the Blind and
Other Severely Handicapped] shall make a continuing study and evaluation of its activities
... for the purpose of assuring effective and efficient administration of the [Wagner-O'Day]
Act." [d. These studies and evaluations address problems of employment of the handi
capped and greater utilization of the handicapped. [d. See supra notes 53-54 and accompa
nying text for a further discussion of the health care industry provisions.
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over the employment relationship.237
CONCLUSION

The National Labor Relations Board has been gIven broad
enough discretion to exercise jurisdiction over handicapped employees
in sheltered workshops. They have exercised this jurisdiction by es
tablishing broad categories for determining whether certain organiza
tions fall under the Act. The Arkansas Lighthouse court is the first
court of appeals to question the distinctions made by the Bo~rd in
determining when to assert jurisdiction. The Arkansas Lighthouse
court takes a view of handicapped individuals, not only as they fall
within the Act, but also in light of other legislation aimed at providing
and extending employment opportunities for the handicapped. The
analysis of the Arkansas Lighthouse court seems to be a realistic posi
tion in response to legislative, economic, and social policies.
Catherine A. Bean

237. See supra note 54 and accompanying text for a discussion of the underlying
policies in enacting the health care provision of the NLRA.

